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The allowance price in Phase I of the European Union Emissions Trading 
Scheme (EU ETS) followed a peculiar path, increasing from €7 in 2005 to over €30 
in 2006, before crashing, recovering and ultimately finishing at zero by the end of 
2007.  I examine if the price can be explained by marginal abatemen  costs as 
predicted by economic theory, or if there were other price determinants.  This has 
important policy implications, since the least-cost solution depends on the equality of 
permit price and marginal abatement costs and is the main argument in favor of 
permit markets.   
I start with a model that incorporates the most commonly cited market 
fundamentals and find that the latter only explain a small part of the allowance price 
variation, raising the question of a bubble.  I carry out two different bubbles tests, the 
  
results of both of which are consistent with the presence of an allowance price 
bubble.   
I then address whether market manipulation by dominant power generators 
could have lead to the initial allowance price increase.  I extend economic theory to 
include the interaction between output and permit markets.  I derive a threshold of 
free allocation beyond which firms find it profitable to manipulate th  permit price 
upwards, even if they are net allowance buyers.  Market data indicates that this 
threshold was exceeded for EU power generators.   
Finally, I investigate the possibility that due to the speed at which t e market 
was set up, firms may have been unable to engage in effective abatement before the 
end of Phase I.  I develop a model under the assumption of no abatement, where firms 
aim to reach compliance exclusively by purchasing allowances on the market.  Thus, 
the allowance payoff becomes that of a binary option, for which I derive a pricing 
formula.  The model fits daily data from the years 2006-7 well.   
I conclude that the allowance price in Phase I was not driven by marginal 
abatement costs, but by a combination of price manipulation, self-fulfiling 
expectations and/or the penalty for noncompliance weighted by the probability of a 
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This dissertation is a hybrid between a three-paper dissertation and a unified 
dissertation.  On the one hand, it is based on three separate papers, two of which I 
already submitted to an economic journal; they are currently under revi w.  I hope to 
submit the third paper shortly.   
On the other hand, the three papers all treat the same subject matter: What 
drove the allowance price during the first phase of the EU ETS?   
Chapters 1 and 6 contain a general introduction and conclusion, respectively, 
that are applicable to all three articles, and I removed the description of the market 
from the individual papers and concentrated it in a separate section (Chapter 2).  I 
also made minor changes such as renaming equations, tables and figures.  In spite of 
this, Chapters 3-5 remain largely self-contained and may give rise to some 
redundancy.  They also are independent in terms of notation, such that a symbol or 
letter appearing in two different chapters may represent two different variables or 
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Chapter 1: Introduction  
On January 1, 2005, the world’s first non-voluntary CO2 emissions market 
opened for business.  The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) is 
the European Union’s prime instrument to achieve its Kyoto targets.  The system 
covers emissions from energy-intensive industries that are responsible for about 45% 
of the EU’s total CO2 emissions.  The EU ETS is by far the largest regulated 
emissions permit market to date, dwarfing other markets in terms of total emissions, 
included installations and market value.   
The market is organized into distinct phases that each have different caps and 
rules.  The first phase covered the years 2005-2007, followed by the second phase, 
which coincides with the 2008-2012 Kyoto compliance period.  No banking was 
allowed between the first and second phases, such that the first phase was a self-
contained market with a finite time horizon.  First-phase emission permits (called EU 
allowances, or EUAs) lost their value if unused for compliance.   
The EUA price during the first phase followed a rather peculiar path, shown in 
Figure 1.1.  It started around €7 but rapidly increased to levels above €20, even 
surpassing €30 at some point, before crashing to half of its value in Apr l 2006, 
stabilizing again in the €13-18 region and finally decreasing to zero by mid 2007, 
where it remained for the rest of the market.   
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The initially very high allowance price is surprising considering that the first 
phase was understood to be a pilot run for the second phase, with the cap not 
expected to be very stringent.  Even more surprising is the stabilization after the price 
crash, followed by a slow march to zero.  Given that the market turned out to be 
oversupplied with permits, the price should have dropped to zero immediately, r her 
than over the course of a year, if it equals marginal abatement costs (unless, of course, 
the fundamentals driving marginal abatement costs also slowly declined over time).  
The three main chapters in this dissertation (Chapters 3-5) are self-contained 
and different in their methods, tools, and even notation to some extent, but they all 
aim to answer the same question: What drove the allowance price during the first 
phase of the EU ETS?  
This question is interesting from an economic theory perspective, but it is 
equally important in terms of policy implications.  The main reason to institute a cap-
and-trade market, as opposed to using command-and-control methods, is that it yields 
the lowest overall cost to reduce emissions to a specific target.1  But if allowance 
prices are too high (i.e. above marginal abatement costs), then the least-cost argument 
vanishes and overall welfare might be better served using a different policy.   Note 
that firms will pass on much of the marginal cost of carbon as they do with any other 
                                                
1 It shares this property with an emissions tax.  In a world without uncertainty and full 
auctioning of permits (or at least no updating of free permit allocations based on events 
during the market), the permit price should equal the emissions tax for the same amount of 
emissions reduction.   
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input to production,2 so in the end it will be consumers that pay too much for a given 
emissions reduction if allowance prices are above their efficient level.   
 
In Chapter 3, I focus on widely identified fundamental price drivers and test 
whether and to what extent they are able to explain the observed allowance price 
path.  A deviation between price and fundamentals is commonly referred to as a price 
bubble.  To the extent that the existence of a bubble can never be fully proven due to 
an identification problem, I carry out two tests that examine whether or not the data is 
consistent with the presence of a bubble.  The first test relies on a market model that 
assumes that the allowance price equals marginal abatement costs.  I estimate this 
model using a regime-switching approach that allows the allowance pri  to depend 
differently on market fundamentals during different time periods.  A likelihood ratio 
test reveals that the two regimes are not mutually independent, but that the state in the 
current period has an impact on the state probability in the next period (Markov 
switching).  This is consistent with a bubble, or a series of stochasti ally crashing 
bubbles with interchanging boom and bust phases.   
The second test relies on cointegration.  If the allowance price and the 
supposed market fundamentals exhibit cointegration, this would be evidence that the 
price was indeed driven by fundamentals, and that therefore there was no bubble.  I 
                                                
2 The degree of cost pass-through depends on the price elasticity of consumer demand.  With 
completely inelastic demand, costs are fully passed through.   
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find no such cointegration in the data.  Thus, while not conclusive, the results from 
both tests are consistent with the bubbles hypothesis.   
Emission permits were initially given away for free in accordance with the 
European Commission’s mandate that countries could sell at most 5 % of their total 
allowances, a measure taken to obtain industry support for the Directive.  Chapter 4 
examines one potential effect of free allocation on the allowance price.  If firms were 
able to pass through the marginal cost of CO2 to consumers, they were in a position to 
reap large windfall profits.  In a competitive and efficient market, windfall profits 
should not lead to permit price distortions.  However, this changes in thepres nce of 
market power.  I examine how the initial allowance allocation affects the permit price 
under the assumption of market power in both the output and the permit marke.  This 
is an extension of Hahn’s (1986) results, which prescribe that a dominant f rm will 
manipulate the permit price upwards (downwards) if it is a net seller (buyer) of 
permits.  I show that when taking the interactions between the output and permit 
market into account, this prescription changes in a significant way, meaning that the 
largest permit holders in the EU ETS (i.e. power producers) would have found it 
profitable to drive up the permit price despite the fact that they w re net allowance 
buyers, assuming that they had some market power.   
Although market power per se is unrelated to the issue of bubbles, every price 
bubble has to get started somehow.  In addition to the basic subject matter th  is the 
thread throughout this dissertation, this provides another link between Chapters 3 and 
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4: Market-power related price manipulation could have driven the allowance price 
upwards, leading to the beginning of an eventually self-sustaining price bubble.  
Chapter 5 is motivated by the possibility that firms may have been unable to 
engage in significant abatement in time for the first phase.  The market was set up at 
breakneck speed relative to “normal” time frames for instituting such markets,3 
providing little time for countries to determine historic emission , define their caps 
and distribute them among different installations.  Firms had even less time to prepare 
for the market, given that their individual permit allocations, the country-level caps 
and thus the total cap was not known until the market had already come into effect.   
Because CO2 cannot be captured in a cost-effective manner today, the main 
sources of abatement are changes in production technology towards less emis ion-
intensive processes, and the substitution of fuels with a lower emission factor per unit 
of output.  Since a change in production technology requires significant plan ing and 
construction time combined with a minimum level of price certainty, fuel switching4 
was commonly assumed to be the abatement method of choice in the first phase of te 
market.  However, energy-intensive industries are generally locked into long-term 
fuel contracts and may have been unable to switch, or unwilling to do so until the 
price signal was more stable.   
                                                
3 The directive that mandated the EU ETS (Directive 2003/87/EC) was issued in October 
2003, just over a year before the market started.   
4 This is not necessarily a substitution within the same plant, but a substitution across plants.  
For example, more of the total electricity demand could be produced using gas-fired 
generation while reducing the output of coal-fired generators.  
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If abatement is not feasible, firms will aim to reach compliance exclusively by 
purchasing allowances on the market.5  With stochastic emissions the exact number of 
allowances needed for compliances is unknown ex ante.  Firms face a situation where 
an additional allowance will be worth the same as the penalty for noncompliance if 
overall emissions exceed the cap at the end of the market, but be worthless if the cap 
turns out not to be binding.  Thus, the payoff of an allowance becomes that of a 
binary cash-or-nothing option.  In Chapter 5, I set up an options pricing model under 
the assumption of no abatement that expresses the allowance price pu ely as a 
function of the penalty and the probability of a binding cap, and fit the resulting 
options pricing formula to market data.   
Chapter 6 draws conclusions on the combined findings in this dissertation.   
                                                
5 Note that the electricity sector cannot reduce output below demand, otherwise the grid 
would crash.  The other sectors could in theory reduce output in order to curb emissions, but 
this is generally assumed to be a costlier measure than buying permits and/or paying the 
penalty for noncompliance.   




Chapter 2: The EU ETS 
 
In the following I describe the main features of the European Union Emissions 
Trading Scheme (EU ETS).  For a more detailed introduction to the market, see 
Kruger & Pizer (2004) and the White Paper by the PEW Institute (2005).   
The EU ETS covers CO2 emissions from 6 broadly defined industry groups in 
all countries of the EU.  These sectors are power & heat, metals and coke ovens, oil 
refineries, glass & ceramics, cement & lime, and paper & pulp.  The emissions 
included in the market account for almost half of the EU’s total CO2 output.  In the 
first phase, about 11,000 individual installations received a total of 2.1 billion EU 
allowances (EUAs) annually, mostly at no cost.  One EUA gives th  bearer a one-
time right to emit one ton of CO2.   
The market is organized into distinct trading phases.   The first phae spanned 
the years 2005-20076 and was considered a pilot run for the second phase, which 
coincides with the Kyoto compliance period of 2008-2012.  Pilot phase allowances 
could not be banked into the second phase and lost their value if unused for 
compliance.  Future phases are planned to last five years each, with no banking 
restrictions from one phase to the next.  On the other hand, borrowing is not allowed 
between any two phases.  But because firms receive annual allowances in March of 
                                                
6 The first trade of the EU ETS was made on February 27, 2003, between Shell and NUON (a 
Dutch utility) under a forward market.   
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every year but don’t have to surrender allowances until the end of April, they can 
effectively bank and borrow across time within a trading phase.   
Firms can trade allowances freely within the EU.  Trades may occur 
bilaterally, through brokers (over-the-counter or OTC trades) or on one of six 
exchanges.7  By April 31 of each year, firms have to surrender permits corresponding 
to their emissions in the previous calendar year.  For every ton of CO2 emissions for 
which firms cannot surrender an allowance, they are fined a penalty of €40 in the first 
phase, and of €100 in the second phase.  In addition, they have to surrender the 
missing allowances in the following year.   
Jurisdiction in the EU ETS is divided between the EC and the member stat s.  
The latter are required to submit detailed national allocation plans (NAPs) to the EC 
for every phase anew (in other words, the cap changes in every phase).  This is a two-
step procedure: First, member states have to decide how much of their overall 
emissions reduction burden (as defined by their individual Kyoto commitments) they 
want to assign to the EU ETS sectors within their countries, with the remainder of the 
burden falling on other sectors such as transportation and households.  In a second
step, the allowances have to be distributed among the individual installations.  All 
NAPs have to be approved by the EC in order to minimize competitive distortions 
among similar companies in different member states.8   
                                                
7 These are ECX, EEX, EXAA, Climex, Nordpool and Powernext.   
8 Although the Trading Directive defines both least-cost achievement of the Kyoto targets and 
harmonization between member states as explicit goals, Boehringer and Lange (2005a) show 
that both cannot be achieved simultaneously, given the constraint of free permit allocation. 
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The scheme is based on Directive 2003/87/EC, which became law on October 
25, 2003.  This left little time for firms and EU member countries to prepare for the 
market. In setting up the first-phase NAPs, countries were faced with the probl m that 
they had very little information about firms’ historic emissions.  Unlike US power 
plants that were subject to emissions regulations since at least th  mid 1990’s, most 
firms in the EU had never had to disclose emissions of other than locl p llutants.  
The member countries addressed this lack of data by using industry projections 
generated by the firms themselves.  In addition, most market partici nts expected 
that second-phase NAPs were going to be based on verified 2005 emissions (which 
was vehemently opposed by the EC, but which took place nonetheless given that this 
was the best data available to the member countries).  Using industry projections and 
defining second-phase allowance allocations based on first-phase emissions clearly 
introduces incentive problems in the sense that firms were encouraged to over-state 
their expected emissions (in order to receive more first-phase allowances), and to 
under-abate (in order to receive more second-phase allowances).9   
Permit allocations, trades and actual emissions are recorded in national 
registries run by each Member State, where all installations hat are subject to the EU 
ETS have their individual accounts. The Central Administrator of the EU runs a 
central registry, called the Community Independent Transaction Log (CITL), which 
connects the 27 national registries and checks the recorded transactions for 
                                                                                                                                           
Thus, there is a tradeoff between efficiency and fairness in terms of a “level playing field” 
between similar firms located in different member states.   
9 For the effects of updating on firms’ decisions, see Boehringer and Lange (2005b).   
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irregularities.  It is the duty of member states to establish and/or verify firms’ actual 
emissions by multiplying energy inputs with appropriate conversion factors.   
The EU ETS is linked to other carbon markets in the sense that certificates 
from Kyoto’s Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), called CERs, and from Joint 
Implementation (JI), called ERUs, can be surrendered instead of EUAs.  Some 
countries imposed a limit as to what the percentage of a firm’s e i sions can be 
covered with such non-EU based emission currencies, but these are still being worked 
out.  In any case, neither CERs nor ERUs were actually available throughout the first 
phase, so for all practical purposes, the first phase of the EU ETS was self-contained.   
Figure 2.1 shows allowances and emissions by EU member country for the 
year 2006.  The largest six countries account for over 70%, both in terms of allocation 
and emissions.  Allocation and emissions by sector are shown in Figures 2.2 and 2.3.  
The power & heat sector received nearly 70% of the total allocation.  At the same 
time, this was the only sector with a net shortage of allowances, with all other sectors 
acting as net allowance suppliers. 10  In terms of installation size, about 90 % of the 
covered firms are relatively small (<1 Mt CO2/y) and received about 19% of the total 
allocation.  On the other extreme of the spectrum are the very large emitters (>10 
Mt/y), which make up less than one percent of all installations in umber but received 
more than a third of all allowances.  Most of these large emitters are power plants.   
                                                
10 Note that these are aggregate numbers; individually, there were power stations with an 
allowance surplus in 2005 and 2006, and many industrial firms with a shortfall.   
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Pre-market expectations of the allowance price were generally very low,11 and 
the steep price increase took many observers by surprise.  For over a year, the 
allowance price was above €20, and at its peak it reached over €31 in April 2006.  
The April price crash was triggered by the first round of emissions verifications, 
which revealed that 2005 emissions were 94 MT below the cap.12  The second round 
of emissions verifications in May 2007 again found an allowance surplus, but this no 
longer had a significant impact since prices had decreased to a few cents.   Liquidity 
was overall high, and a significant amount of the total allocation was traded even in 
the first year.  Table 2.1 shows a market summary of the first phase.   
 
                                                
11 In a simulation-based analysis of the EU ETS, Reilly and Paltsev (2005) calculated market-
clearing marginal abatement costs to be € 0.6-0.9 for their base scenario, with prices in even 
the most extreme scenarios below €7. Medium price estimates by brokers wer  omewhat 
higher, around of €5.00 for the first phase (PEW, 2005). 
12 Emissions verification numbers were planned to be announced in May, but in late April 
reports were leaked that Belgium, France, the Czech Republic, the Netherlands and Estonia 
all had allowance surpluses, and the allowance shortage in Spain was much smaller than 
anticipated. By early May, the market was found to be 63.6 Mt long, with 21 countries 
reporting.  It is interesting to note that the announcement of the Polish surplus of another 26 
Mt in September 2006 did not affect prices very much.   




Chapter 3: Price Drivers and CO2 Bubbles in the EU ETS 
 
(Paper submitted to JEEM in July 2008) 
 
Abstract 
In the first phase of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS), the price 
per ton of CO2 rose to over €30 before decreasing to zero by mid 2007.  I examine to 
what extent this variation can be explained by market fundamentals, and whether 
there was a price bubble.  The presence of the latter would question the main 
argument in favor of permit markets, which is to achieve a given emissions cap at 
least cost.  I derive a structural model of the allowance price under the assumption 
efficient markets, which I gradually relax by allowing for delayed adjustment of price 
to fundamentals, as well as by introducing lagged LHS variables.  The pattern of the 
results suggests that a price bubble is at least possible.  I then pursue this hypothesis 
further by carrying out two different bubbles tests, both of which are consistent with 
the presence of a bubble.   
 
Keywords: Emissions permit markets, air pollution, climate change, bubble, 
speculation, CO2, asset pricing, EU ETS.   
JEL classification: D84, G12, G14, Q52-54  




The allowance price per ton of carbon dioxide (CO2) in first phase of the 
European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) exhibited tremendous 
variation. It started around €5 but quickly increased to a range of €20-30 where it 
remained for over a year.  The price crashed after the first round of emissions 
verifications that showed the market to be long, but recovered somewhat and 
remained around €15 for another few months, before starting a gradual decline.  By 
mid 2007, an allowance was virtually worthless.  
Market analysts and economists alike have been looking for reasons behind 
the peculiar allowance price movement.  Some have pointed to market fundamentals 
such as fuel prices and the weather (Alberola et al., 2008, Bunn and Fezzi, 2007, 
Mansanet-Bataller et al., 2007, Rickels et al., 2007) but others found no such 
correlation and confined themselves to forecasting based on pure time-series 
approaches (Chesney and Taschini, 2008, Paolella and Taschini, 2006).  Whereas t  
April 2006 crash can be explained by the lower-than-expected overall emission 
reports, it is not clear why the allowance price was driven that high in the first place.13  
Also, the fact that it did not collapse completely but remained at a (in hindsight) very 
high level through 2006 lacks a satisfactory explanation.   
                                                
13 In theory, market participants need not know aggregate emissions for the price to be 
efficient. If every firm with a permit surplus (deficit) sells (buys) permits on the market, the 
price should marginal abatement costs regardless of emissions verifications.   
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In this paper I examine if and to what extent the allowance price in the first 
phase of the EU ETS was based on market fundamentals.  I first set up an economic 
model that specifies allowance price changes as a function of a set of widely accepted 
price drivers (fuel prices, temperature, reservoir levels, economic indicators and 
announcements of verified emissions), under the assumption of efficient markets and 
using the best data available.  I then relax this model by introducing lagged 
fundamentals to account for non-immediate adjustment of allowance pris to 
changes in fundamentals and to proxy for unobserved expectations about 
fundamentals.  In a further step I add past price changes as predictors of current price 
changes and gage their importance relative to the fundamentals.   
I find that only a small portion of the allowance price variation can be 
explained by market fundamentals, even when taking into account dynamic 
expectations about fundamentals.  A situation where an asset price is driven by 
expectations about future increases in a manner that is detached from fundamentals is 
commonly referred to as a price bubble.  All tests to identify bubbles ar  inherently 
plagued by an identification problem, since the researcher can never know whether a 
difference between the price and the “true” value of an asset is due to a bubble, or to a 
misspecification of the market structure when calculating the intrinsic value (Flood 
and Garber, 1980, Garber, 1989, Gurkaynak, 2005).  However, a permit market seems 
an especially appropriate place to investigate the presence of a bubble because the 
asset in question has a clearly defined value: One allowance is worth the cost of 
reducing aggregate CO2 emissions to one ton below the aggregate cap.  This is in 
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contrast to stock prices, where it is often unclear what a stock is really worth and 
should lead to a fairly trustworthy estimate of the intrinsic value, thus reducing the 
danger of identification error considerably.   
The contribution of this section of the dissertation is threefold:  First, the 
stepwise procedure of starting with economic theory and then relaxing the most 
stringent constraints allows insights into the determinants of the EU ETS allowance 
price that go beyond existing analyses, which typically do not start from a rigorous 
economic model and determine model specification on a mostly ad-hoc basis.  
Second, I use a dataset of daily weather measurements in dozens of monitoring 
stations across Europe reaching back over three decades, which I combine with 
detailed information about regional population density to account for population-
weighed temperature deviations from their long-term expectations.  No dataset of 
comparable quality has been used in the literature address the influence of weather 
shocks on the allowance price.  Last, to my knowledge no permit market has ever 
been tested for the presence of a price bubble, although such markets app ars to offer 
more favorable conditions than stock markets to mitigate the identification problem 
encountered in any bubbles test.   
In the next section I review the literature and derive the market model.  In 
Section 3.3, I introduce the data and present the estimation results for the p oposed 
models.  Section 3.4 contains two bubbles tests, one based on regime switching and 
the other on cointegration between allowance prices and market fundame tals, and 
Section 3.5 concludes.   




3.2. Allowance market model 
3.2.a.)  Literature 
There is a large volume of empirical work about the SO2 permit trading 
system in the USA (Carlson, 2000, Joskow et al., 1998, Montero, 1999, Schmalensee, 
1998, Stavins, 1998) and more recently (Burtraw et al., 2005, Kosobud et al., 2005), 
to name only a few.  For the EU ETS, the empirical literature is scarcer because it is a 
much newer market, and because fewer data are available in general since the 
involved firms previously faced very little regulation.14  There exists a number of 
studies that model the EUA price and its volatility mainly for risk management and 
forecasting purposes (Benz and Trueck, 2006, Chesney and Taschini, 2008, Fehr and 
Hinz, 2006, Seifert et al., 2008).  While useful for companies that need to hedge 
against the risk embedded in carbon prices, they do not shed much light on 
fundamental price drivers.   
I am aware of four papers that explicitly aim to determine the impact of 
market fundamentals:  Bunn and Fezzi (2007) use a cointegrated VAR modelwith 
allowances, electricity and gas in the UK and daily temperature in London as an 
exogenous variable, and impose the necessary identifying restrictions using auxiliary 
                                                
14 In the USA, historic emissions and information about production, fuel use and abatement 
are readily available, which is not the case in the EU.   
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regressions.  They find that the gas price influences the EUA price, and that both gas 
and EUA prices help determine the electricity price.   
Mansanet-Batallet et al. (2007) focused on EU-wide fuel prices and a weather 
index comprised of several cities. They focus on the first year of the market only and 
include dummies for the six largest price changes, which end up accounting for most 
of the explanatory power of their model.15  This sidesteps the question of what 
actually drives the allowance price.  In addition, they include regressors that are not 
obviously related to allowance prices, such as the Brent oil price.16  They find that oil 
prices, natural gas prices and temperature in Germany are the only significant 
allowance price drivers, whereas other determinants (such as the EU weather index 
and coal prices) turned out to be uncorrelated.   
Alberola et al. (2008) use temperatures in capital cities of six EU countries, 
along with a number of EU-wide energy variables, and extent the analysis to the first 
two years of the market.  Unfortunately, they treat highly endogenous variables such 
as electricity prices, clean dark and clean spark spreads17 s exogenous determinants 
                                                
15 It is not clear what the explanatory power of the fundamentals themselves is since no 
estimation results are presented for a model without dummies.   
16 The explanation given for including oil prices is not very clear.  They cit  a study by 
Christiansen et al. (2005) which looked at very general determinants for greenhouse gas 
markets, but is not specific to fuel switching in the EU’s power sector.   Very little power is 
generated using oil in Europe, so a switch from oil to gas is not likely to be the marginal 
abatement activity.   
17 The dark spreads is the theoretical gross profit of a power plant to generate a unit of 
electricity using coal, having bought the fuel necessary to produce it: Dark spread = power 
price-fuel price*heat rate.  The heat rate is the efficiency at which a power plant converges 
energy in fuel into electric output.  The clean dark spread is the dark spread minus CO2 costs 
embedded in producing a unit of electricity: Clean dark spread=dark spread-CO2 
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of the allowance price.18  This is no problem for forecasting, but endogeneity will lead 
to biased coefficient estimates of the price drivers.  
Rickels et al. (2007) build on Mansanet-Bataller et al. (2007) but include data 
through 2006.  They separate allowance price determinants into supply and demand 
side, and their choice of market fundamentals seems more appropriate than that of 
Alberola et al. (2008) and more complete than that of Bunn & Fezzi (2007).  
However, their econometric specification is questionable:  Although they c ck for 
cointegration between allowance and fuel prices (they find none) and thus implicitly 
acknowledge the presence of unit roots in the price data, they specify their model in 
levels as opposed to differences (or returns) to render the data stationary.  A 
nonstationary error may lead to untrustworthy coefficient estimates.   
All four studies are valuable contributions to finding allowance price 
determinants, but neither is based on a rigorous economic market model.  Th  
inclusion/exclusion of market fundamentals as well as the econometric specification 
is mostly ad-hoc, which leads to the aforementioned problems.  They also do not take 
into account the no-banking provision from the first into the second phase, and they 
include lagged market fundamentals as well as lagged EUA prices as allowance price 
fundamentals from the outset without discussing the economic meaning of this.  If 
yesterday’s price change determines today’s, then what determines yest rday’s price 
                                                                                                                                           
price*emission intensity.  The spark spread and clean spark spread are analogous measures 
for gas-generated electricity.   
18 Although the electricity price, and thus spreads, is correlated with the EUA, the causation is 
very likely the other way around, because electricity producers pass carbon costs (at least 
partly) through to consumers.   
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change, and what are the true determinants of allowance prices?  In the following I set 
up a simple economic model of the allowance price that explicitly addresses these 
issues.   
 
3.2.b.)  Base model 
In order to incorporate the uncertainty inherent in the demand and supply of 
allowances as well as the fixed time horizon of the first market phase I follow an 
approach by Maeda (2004), who analyzed the effect of uncertainty in busi ess-as-
usual (BAU) emissions (referring to emissions in the absence of a carbon cost).  I 
extend his model to T periods, where each period represents one day and T
corresponds to the number of business days during the first phase of the EU ETS.  Let 
BAU it represent firm i’s random BAU emissions in period t, which depend on a 
























Firm i’s BAU emissions in the current period are the sum of expected 
emissions and an adjustment term that is proportional to a shock in Ψt which contains 
exogenous variables that influence either demand or supply of emissions.  Abatement 
is defined as the difference between firm i’s BAU and actual emissions e:  
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(3.2) ittitit eBAUa −Ψ= )(  
Abatement has a cost defined by a firm’s abatement cost funcion or its 
derivative, the marginal abatement cost (MAC) function.  As is well known from 
permit market theory, each firm chooses abatement such that its MAC is equal to the 
permit price in every period, which implicitly defines the optimal amount of 
abatement:   
 ))(,,())(,,( 1** titttitittittititt BAUXMACaBAUXaMAC Ψ=⇒Ψ=
− σσ , 
where Xt refers to a vector of variables that determines the MAC function.  To clear 
the market, aggregate abatement has to equal the difference between overall BAU 
















Because firms involved in the production of power & heat are dominant 
within the EU ETS, it makes sense to focus on emissions and abatement in this sector. 
I will further assume that the predominant method of abatement is a (marginal) shift 
in the generation dispatch order away from coal towards gas, as the former is more 
than twice as emissions-intensive per unit of output than the latter.19  Fuel switching is 
                                                
19 This shift will take place in the medium load spectrum, as peak load is already generated 
using gas (and hydro) and base load is generated using nuclear, lignite and coal.  Most likely 
Chapter 3: Bubbles 
 21 
 
generally considered to be important in the EU ETS (Alberola, et al., 2008, 
Christiansen, et al., 2005, Delarue and D'haeseleer, 2007, Fehr and Hinz, 2006).  This 
means that in addition to BAU emissions, abatement costs in the EU ETS depend on 
gas and coal prices, which I will denominate as tG  and tC .  If aggregate marginal 
abatement costs are approximately linear over the range where fu l switching is 
feasible,20 the market’s abatement cost function can be written as21  












The coefficients c>0 and b>0 indicate nonzero and increasing marginal 
abatement costs, respectively.  Aggregate MAC increases with gas prices and 
decreases with coal prices, such that d1 > 0 and d2 < 0.  Increased BAU emissions 
translate in more necessary abatement to achieve the fixed cap S , which means that 
0>g .   
In equilibrium, allowance demand must equal supply and the aggregate MAC 
has to equal the permit price.  This allows me to solve for the optimal aggregate 
abatement:  
                                                                                                                                           
it would entail the replacement of some very inefficient coal generators by combined cycle 
gas generators (CCGTs).   
20 In reality, the MAC functions of individual firms are step functions.  However, aggregate 
MACs on a sectoral level will be almost continuous over a certain rangedue to the range in 
different generator efficiencies.   
21 I also tried a specification where prices enter as logs, as is usually done in the finance 
literature.  It is not obvious in this case which specification is more appropriate. In any case, 
the final results turned out to be very similar.   
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I now take expectations at time t, subtract them from (3.6) and simplify: 
























Entries for periods before t cancel out because their ex-post expectation is the 
same as their realization.  Likewise, the terms bcT /  and S  do not vary over time and 
cancel.  Substituting (3.1) and dividing by N yields 












































Provided that the error is stationary, the last term’s mean and v riance go to 
zero as N goes to infinity.  The intuition behind this is that uncorrelated, firm-specific 
shocks cancel each other out in a large market, i.e. only shocks that affect all firms 
simultaneously have an impact on BAU emissions (and thus on marginal abatement 
costs).  Simplifying the notation and solving for allowance prices results in  
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where β  is the average covariance between aggregate BAU emissions and Ψt u er 






βββ .   
If markets are efficient, prices incorporate changes in underlying 
fundamentals immediately (Malkiel, 2007), implying that tttt PPrPE ρ≡+=+ )1(][ 1 , 
where r  is the interest rate.   Equation (3.7) can be solved recursively (see Appendix 
A) to 






























The allowance price is determined by the previous-day price, changes in fuel 
prices and shocks to tΨ .  The summation term in the denominators of the RHS 
decreases through time and indicates that shocks to exogenous variables increasingly 
affect the permit price.  This makes intuitive sense: In the beginning of the market, a 
shock to emissions should not influence the permit price much, as it will likely be 
neutralized by shock in the opposite direction later on.  As time progresses this 
probability diminishes.  This means that in theory, fluctuations in the allowance price 
should increase towards the end of the market.  In practice, there is also an opposite 
effect: New markets typically show more volatility than mature ones because market 
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participants learn.  Combined with the (in hindsight) apparent allowance surplus 
which drove the price down to transaction costs by mid 2007, it seems likely that this 
effect overshadows the inherent increasing uncertainty in a time-limited permit 
market without banking.   
In theory, the discount rate in equation (3.8) could be estimated directly using 
nonlinear tools.  However, in practice the day-to-day discount rate is v ry close to 
zero.  I therefore simplify the equation (3.8) to 


























where ∆ refers to the first-difference operator. To keep the estimation linear I use an 
annual discount rate of 10% to calculate the denominators on the RHS.22 
I assume that consumer demand is inelastic in the short term.  Because 
demand must meet supply at all times in the electricity grid, tΨ  includes factors that 
determine either demand or supply of BAU emissions.  Specifically, I will include 
temperatures across Europe, reservoir levels in the Nordic countries, the DAX and a 
dummy indicating the first round of emissions verifications.  The assumptions behind 
this choice are the following: Temperatures affect consumer demand through 
increased changes in heating (winter) or cooling (summer); reservoir levels influences 
                                                
22 The choice of discount rate is more important for the RHS because small changes can cause 
significant differences in the numerical value for the summation term.  However, using 
discount rates of 5% and 20% did not significantly change the results.  
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emissions on the supply side through the availability of renewable energy;23 and the 
DAX is a proxy for overall economic performance in the EU’s largest economy. This 

























































































Although the error εt  is uncorrelated over time, I allow its conditional 
variance to change using an ARCH(1) specification, which is standard procedure in 
the analysis of price series as price changes tend not to follow a normal distribution 
with a fixed variance.24   
                                                
23 The more hydro and wind power available, the less power has to be produced using fossil 
fuels, and thus the lower are BAU emissions.  See also Christiansen (2005).   
24 The alternative would be to drop the assumptions of Gaussian errors altogether, which has 
been forcefully advocated by Mandelbrot (1997, 2004).  In my regime-switching bubbles test 
(see below) I use a t-distribution.  
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In order to define shocks to reservoir levels and the weather, I n ed a measure 
of what “normal” levels are.  For reservoir levels, I use weekly median levels based 
on the years 1991-2006.  Because reservoir levels are cumulative by nature, a level of 
one TWh below the median level today will lead to an expectation of tomorrow’s 
level also to be one TWh too low, assuming that precipitation is “normal”. To 
represent an unanticipated shock in reservoir levels I form first differences, such that 
)(][1
med
tttttt RRRRER −∆=∆≡− −
)
.   






TTE , where d refers to the calendar day corresponding to day t 
and y to years.  Because traders are likely to take weather forecasts into account and 
the weather over the weekends should influence Monday trades I calculate 5-d y 
moving averages of temperature minus its expectation centered on the current day: 














.  An alternative would be to use first 
differences for reasons analogous to those discussed for reservoir l vels, but the 
problem with this approach is that smoothing combined with differencing leads to 
very low variation, possibly diminishing any real signal below noise.  
Comparing (3.9) to (3.10) shows that the latter is a reduced form of the former 
because the parameters b , g  and β  are not individually identified, only their 
combined impact. While specification (3.10) is well grounded in economic theory, it 
is based on two rather strong assumptions.  First, expectations of tomrrow’s 
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fundamental prices are today’s fundamental prices.  Second, allowance price changes 
are not autocorrelated over time.  In the following two subsections I relax these 
assumptions.   
 
3.2.c.)  Introducing dynamic expectations of fundamental prices 
So far I have assumed that EUA prices have the Markov property in the sense 
that tomorrow’s price is a function only of today’s price, but not of the preceding 
price path.  The Markov property is the centerpiece of asset pricing for stocks and 
derivatives, and essentially implies that there are no arbitrage opportunities.25  If all 
traders have rational expectations and access to the same information, a belief (for 
whatever reason) that a price will reach a certain level in the future will push the price 
to that level today.  The Markov property also implies that without storage costs, spot 
and futures prices are equal, and that spot and forward prices differ exactly by the rate 
of interest (Hull, 2002).   
In reality, however, the relationship between spot and futures prices can be 
quite different, even when taking storage costs into account.  Whatever the reason 
(asymmetric information, risk aversion, fixed contracts or bounded rationality), it is 
possible that traders form their expectations about prices for EUA fundamentals not 
only based on today’s prices, but also on past prices and a combination of spot and 
futures prices.   
                                                
25 If prices were a function of the past price path, chartist traders could use this information to 
their advantage.  However, there is  little evidence that they are in fact able to do so.   
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The problem is that it is impossible to know a priori which variables that 
model traders’ unobserved expectations best.  In order to search for the combination 




















































































































where StG  refers to the spot (day-ahead, to be exact) price for UK natural gas, 
M
tT  is 
the monthly deviation of temperature from the expected value and all other variables 
are defined as above.  I estimate (3.11) for each possible combination of the indices 
(i, …, q) using an ARCH(1) model and choose the specification that yields the lowest 
BIC.26 The best-fitting specifications for the full, pre-crash and post crash periods are 
the following:  
                                                
26 Bayesian Information Criterion, also known as Schwartz’ Information Criterion.  This 
criterion trades off model fit and model parsimony and puts more weight on the latter th n 
Akaike’s Information Criterion.  This procedure results in estimating 8*8*8*4*4*2*2*3*3= 
294,912 ARCH regressions, and it took the 24 computers in AREC-UMD’s experimental lab 











































3.2.d.)  Introducing lagged EUA price changes 
Although the variance in specifications (3.10) and (3.11) is allowed to vary 
over time due to the ARCH(1) term, the error itself is still supposed to be 
uncorrelated over time.  If the residuals are autocorrelated, it is common to either 
specify an ARMA (p, q) error or to introduce lagged LHS variables on the RHS of the
equation.27  
Inclusion of lagged LHS variables can reduce or eliminate autocorrelation of 
the residuals and increase the overall fit of the model.  This is the reason why most 
analyses of time series include either lagged prices or AR terms in the error.  
However, this comes at a price:  Because of different possible causes for 
autocorrelation, the interpretation of the regression coefficients can become difficult.  
                                                                                                                                           
over two days to complete this task.  Including eith r more variables in (3.11) or widening the 
candidate sets would be very challenging in terms of raw computing power (in May 2008, 
that is).   Note that if either of (i, j, k), (l, m), (n, o) and (p, q) draw the same variable from 
their respective candidate set, one of them is dropped due to multicollinearity, which means 
that the number of regressors included in (3.11) ranges from a minimum of 6 (5 plus a 
dummy) to a maximum of 12.   
27 Without any exogenous variables, AR (p) in the error term and p lagged LHS variables are 
equivalent specifications, but this changes in the presence of exogenous variables (Bauwens 
et al., 1999, p. 144).  Also note that including laged LHS variables and MA(q) error terms at 
the same time will lead to biased estimation, because the regressors are no longer independent 
of the error term.   
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This is not a problem if the main goal is price forecasting, but what is the meaning of 
a lagged LHS variable in a structural equation that seeks to define price determinants?  
This question is routinely ignored, but in this context this would be inappropriate.  
Autocorrelation in the residuals from estimating (3.11) could in principle be 
caused by three different reasons: First, there could be an omitted fundamental 
variable that is related to the allowance price, and which exhibits autocorrelation.  In 
this case, lagged LHS variables would serve as instruments for the mitt d exogenous 
variable.  Second, expectations about future fundamental prices could not be captured 
adequately by the additional terms in (3.11), and the true expectations exhibit 
autocorrelation.  Third, allowance prices could increase simply becaus they are 
expected to do so based on past increases, regardless of fundamentals.  This would be 
the case of a price bubble. The coexistence of these three possibilitie  has made 
conclusive testing for the existence of a price bubbles an almost i possible task, 
especially in the absence of clearly defined market fundamentals.  I will examine this 
issue further in section 3.4.   
Because the residuals from (3.11) indeed exhibit autocorrelation (see below), I 
include five lags of allowance price changes in (3.11) but leave the equation 
otherwise unchanged.  I discuss the economic meaning of including lagged LHS 
variables in a regression below.   
 




The type and provenance of my data is as follows:  
EUA prices: Daily series of over-the-counter (OTC) prices, Point Carbon.28   
Gas prices: Daily series of ICE month-ahead futures and Zeebrugge day-ahead prices 
for UK natural gas.   
Coal prices: McCloskey coal marker for North-Western Europe, which incorporates 
information on all trades concerning coal that enters Europe from abroad and which 
reach maturity within 3 months.  It is an average of actual transactions or, in their 
absence, an assessment of fair value by traders.  This marker is published weekly. 
Temperature: From the European Climate Assessment & Dataset29, which has daily 
entries from a large number of monitoring locations across Europe. I weighted 
temperature deviations by population around each monitoring location, using a World 
Bank city area population dataset.   
Nordic reservoir levels: Weekly reservoir levels (in TWh) and median levels based on 
1991-2006 taken from Nordpool exchange. The Nordpool market (Norway, Sweden 
and Finland) is the main hydropower-producing region in Europe.   
 
                                                
28 Available at www.pointcarbon.com, last accessed in February 2008.    
29 Klein Tank et al., “Daily Dataset of 20th-century surface air temperature and precipitation 
series for the European Climate Assessment”, 2007, available at http://eca.knmi.nl.   
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I estimate equation (3.10) separately for the January 2005 to June 2007,30 as 
well as for the period before the price crash induced by the first round of emissions 
verifications in April 2006 (“pre-crash”) and after (“post-crash”).  Visual inspection 
of the price graph as well as previous analyses (Alberola, et l., 2008, Bunn and 
Fezzi, 2007) indicate that the relationship between market fundamentals and the 
allowance price likely changed after the price adjustment.  Because the DAX lacked 
correlation in this as well as all following models, and its inclusion increased both 
Akaike’s and Schwarz’ information criteria, I removed it from all regressions and re-
estimated them without it.  
The results are presented in Table 3.1. The coefficient estimates ar  
significantly different before and after the price crash based on an LR test, confirming 
the suspected structural break.  Gas prices are positive and significant for all periods, 
and summer temperatures are significant in the two subperiods.  The crash dummy 
and the ARCH terms (not shown) are highly significant, as expected, but none of the 
other variables appears to be associated with EUA price changes. The residuals from 
all three regressions exhibit autocorrelation.   
The goodness of fit of the model (calculated as the model sum of square  
divided by the total sum of squares) shows that the overwhelming part of the model’s 
predictive power is due to the emissions verification dummy.  Less than 4 % of the 
                                                
30 As can be seen in Fig. 2. 2, prices reached transaction costs of a few cents by mid 2007, 
which makes the inclusion of the second half of 2007 pointless.   
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variation is explained in the pre-crash model, whereas the fit in the post-crash period 
is even worse with 1%.  
Results from estimating (3.11) are shown in the first two columns of Table 
3.2.  Once again, the coefficients before and after the price crash are significantly 
different, confirming the structural break.  Autocorrelation persists in the residuals 
from (3.11), although to a lesser degree than for (3.10).  Due to the presnce of 
various “flavors” of the same type of variable, the coefficients and associated p-
values of the individual lags lose their straightforward interpretation.  For example, 
the two coefficients on the reservoir level variables are of opposite sign but similar 
magnitude for the full and the post-crash period.  In contrast, gas prices are 
consistently positive except for the coefficient on spot prices in the post-crash period.  
Winter temperatures now have the expected sign in all periods (an  are significant in 
the full and post-crash period), whereas summer temperatures are positive for the full 
and pre-crash period but negative and for the post-crash period. In any case, the main 
focus here is on model fit, which has improved in terms of BIC by construction, but 
not by very much, in spite of the serious data-mining exercise to find the “best” 
specification: 31  The model predicts about 11% of the variation in the pre-crash 
period, and less 3 % for the period after the crash.   
                                                
31 I want to emphasize that the point of data-mining equation (3.11) for the best fit is to show 
that even so, the model does not explain much of the variation in EUA prices, and is highly 
sensitive to the inclusion of lagged LHS variables.  A good fit from such a procedure would 
not prove anything.   
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Introducing 5 lags of allowance price changes into specification (3.11) yields 
the results presented in columns 3 and 4 of Table 3.2.  Lagged EUA price changes are 
very effective in explaining current price changes in all periods.  However, the 
inclusion of the LHS lags takes its toll on the explanatory power of the exogenous 
variables.  Other than gas and the crash dummy, none of the coefficients is 
statistically significant.  Note that in spite of the lagged price changes, autocorrelation 
persists, as well as evidence for a structural break.  
 
Taken together, the results shown in Tables 3.1-3.2 imply the following:    
1.)  Allowance prices appear to violate the Markov property.  Market 
fundamentals are not immediately internalized, as past changes in fundamentals help 
explain a portion of the price movements.  Furthermore, price changes exhibit 
autocorrelation.   
2.)  There was a structural break in the allowance price series aft r the price 
adjustment due to the emissions verifications in April 2006.  The coeffi ients on 
market fundamentals from estimating the subperiod before and after the price crash 
are significantly different.   
3.)  UK Gas prices are consistently associated with the allowance price before 
the price adjustment in April 2006.  This is consistent with results ob ained by Bunn 
& Fezzi (2007) and Alberola et al. (2008).   
4.)  Coal prices do not appear to be significantly correlated with the EUA 
price, even though they should be important if fuel switching is an important form of 
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abatement.  This is probably due to the fact that they exhibit much less variation than 
gas prices.   
5.)  Temperatures and reservoir levels help determine the allowance price, but 
they are sensitive to the model specification and time period.   
6.)  When lagged EUA price changes are introduced into the model, they 
absorb most of the price variation while all exogenous variables lose their 
significance, with the exception of gas prices.  The overall model fit greatly increases, 
but some autocorrelation persists.   
 
As discussed in more detail above, persistent autocorrelation and the 
dominance of lagged LHS variables in explaining the EUA price variation could be 
due to omitted exogenous (autocorrelated) variables, expectations about fundamentals 
or a bubble-like phenomenon.  However, the pattern of results gives some indications 
as to which possibility is more likely.   
My model contains all of the variables that are widely considered to drive the 
allowance price.  In order for an unobserved exogenous variable to drive the r sults, 
this variable would have to be very important, exhibit strong autocorrelation and a 
pattern similar to the very distinct price movement of the EUA.  The existence of 
such an exogenous variable seems unlikely.   
I proxied expectations about fundamentals by introducing various time lags of 
these variables into the model.  Although this method is certainly an imperfect 
measure of expectations, even the best-fitting combination of fundamentals ou  of 
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almost 300,000 possibilities did not provide a very good model of EUA price 
changes.  Naturally there are more variables and lags that could be included in the 
model, but based on my results so far it seems unlikely that expectations about market 
fundamentals are behind the very distinct EUA price path.   
The overall poor performance of the models without lagged EUA price 
changes, the instability of the exogenous variables across models and time periods, 
the fact that all fundamentals except for UK gas prices lose their significance as soon 
as lagged prices are introduced and the persistence of autocorrelation across models 
are all consistent with self-fulfilling expectations about the allowance price as a main 
price driver, as would be the case in a price bubble.  In the next section I examine this 
issue further and carry out two bubbles tests.   
 
3.4.  A CO2 Bubble? 
3.4.a.)  Some bubble background 
Regardless of whether or not prices have the Markov property, they are 
supposed to be driven by market fundamentals (hence the name) according t  the 
Capital Asset Pricing Model and Modern Portfolio Theory, two workhorses of 
modern financial economics.  Generally, an asset’s price Pt  can be represented as 
tttt BFP ε++=  (Diba and Grossman, 1987, 1988, Flood and Garber, 1980), where 
tF  represents the market fundamental (or intrinsic asset value), tB  is a bubble term 
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and tε  white noise.  Prices that are determined exclusively by tF  are a special case 
where the bubble term is set to zero.   
A positive bubble term is due to traders’ expectations.  If traders b lieve that 
prices will increase, or believe that most other traders believe this (and so forth ad 
infinitum), any random price expectation can be self-fulfilling.32  After a time of 
expectation-driven price increases, market participants will eventually realize that the 
price is too high.33  This will set in motion a positive feedback loop of asset sales, 
downward adjustment of future price expectations and yet more sales.  Note that in a 
bubble, traders know that an asset’s price is above its intrinsic value, but they buy (or 
hold) the asset anyway because they expect further price increases.   
There exists an ample literature about price bubbles, an illuminating survey of 
which is given by Camerer (1989) and, more recently by Abreu & Brunnemei r 
(2003).  The cornerstone of bubble theory is something called a growing rat onal 
bubble, which refers to a constant term that appears in solutions to difference 
equations that describe price formation in a market.  Growing rational bubbles 
increase exponentially at the rate of interest.34  Under the standard assumption of 
rational expectations, growing rational bubbles cannot exist with a finite number of 
                                                
32 The assumption that prices are not driven by fundamentals but by traders’ beliefs is the 
basis for technical or “chartist” analysis.  Chartists aim to predict future price movements 
based on past price alone, and have come up with a range of tools and indicators such as price 
floors and ceilings, “head-and-shoulders”, turning points and more.   
33 This can be triggered by an event such as one largseller coming to the market, a bearish 
news report, or a round of emissions verifications as was the case in April 2006.  
34 Blanchard and Watson (1982) developed the theory for stochastically crashing bubbles, 
where traders know that the bubble will burst but not when.  Stochastically crashing bubbles 
have to grow at a rate greater than the rate of interes .    
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agents trading a limited number of assets in a discrete time setting.  The reasons for 
this were formally developed by Tirole (1982), but to put it simply, it will be 
irrational to hold the asset just before the bubble bursts, and therefore by backward 
induction it will be irrational to hold the asset in any earlier period.  
A widely used approach to solving the bubble existence problem has been to 
allow for either some sort of irrationality or for incomplete information (Black, 1986, 
Day and Huang, 1990, Frankel and Froot, 1990, Friedman and Aoki, 1992), and 
bubbles have been shown to persist in lab experiments even with experienced subjects 
(Hussam et al., 2008).  In the following I will sidestep the question of theoretical 
existence and focus on investigating whether a bubble did xist.   
 
3.4.b.)  Bubble tests 
Bubbles tests have been largely confined to stocks that pay dividends.  In such 
a setup, the market fundamental can be shown to be the expected current valu  of the 
dividend stream.  Gurkaynak (2005) reviewed a series of bubbles tests, all of which 
base their analysis on S&P 500 prices and dividends going back to 1871.  Some
appear not to be appropriate to test for the presence of a bubble either on conceptual 
and/or econometric grounds,35 whereas others are more convincing (West, 1987) but 
                                                
35 For example, variance bounds tests as introduced by Shiller (1981) and LeRoy and Porter 
(1981) rely on dividends observed into the infinite future, which clearly cannot be 
implemented.  However, ways of getting around this problem (such as using the last observed 
dividend as the terminal price) void the test of its meaning, as rejection of the null is no 
longer linked to the presence of a bubble (Flood et al., 1994).   
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cannot be implemented for an asset that has no stream of returns such as one-time 
allowances.  The classes of bubbles tests that can most readily be implemented in the 
EUA context involve cointegration and regime switching tests.  
Cointegration tests are based on the assumption that any bubble term would 
have to increase faster than the underlying fundamentals.  If the pric and 
fundamental series are cointegrated, this is clearly not the case.  Therefore, a test for 
cointegration between asset price and fundamental amounts to a bubbles test.  Such 
tests have been proposed by Diba & Grossman (1987, 1988) and by Hamilton and 
Whiteman (1985).   
Bubbles tests based on cointegration have been attacked on two grounds 
(Evans, 1986): Whereas bubble theory predicts that a bubble can never be rendered 
stationary no matter how many times it is differenced, this may not be true with real 
data and small samples.  In reality, prices do not follow a purely exponential increase 
because they are influenced by too many other observed and unobserved factors.  
Hence, any real price will eventually become (or at least appe r) stationary when 
differenced a sufficient number of times.   
Second, a price that contains a series of stochastically crashing bubbles may 
well pass a stationarity test, especially if the magnitude of price increases and 
decreases is roughly equal (Evans, 1986, Hall et al., 1999).   To solve this problem, 
regime switching methods have been developed (Engel and Hamilton, 1990, Hall, et 
al., 1999, Kim et al., 2008, Schaller and van Norden, 1997).  Such models allow the 
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data to be in more than one state.  The presence of different regimes is then 
interpreted as evidence for a series of bubbles.   
 
3.4.c.)  Cointegration test 
Cointegration between EUA prices and market fundamentals would implythat 
price movements can be accounted for by changes in fundamentals, and that therefore 
there cannot be a bubble.  Note that this is not the same as the estimations described 
in section 4, as the presence of cointegration would imply that eqs. (3.10-11) are 
misspecified, because they are written entirely in terms of differences but not levels 
of the integrated variables.  
Unit root tests indicate that the EUA price series, fuel prices, r servoir level 
deviations and the DAX each are integrated of order 1, whereas temperature 
deviations are stationary.  The five integrated variables are plotted in Figure3.1.   
To test for cointegration, I start by re-specifying (3.10) as an Autoregressive 














)(LA  is a lag polynomial defined by 
ptptttLA −−− −−−−= σασασασ ...1)( 2211 ; )(LBi  and )(LC j , )4,3,2,1(∈i  and 
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)2,1(∈j , are lag polynomials of potentially different order each.  I choose 5 lags for 
























4321 −−−−−= σ  
is stationary if the EUA price is cointegrated with the fundamentals,36 with )1(A  and 
)1(iB  referring to the sum of all coefficients of the corresponding polynomials.  The 
variable tz  measures how much out of equilibrium the cointegrated variables are in
any given period, with 0=tz  indicating the long-term equilibrium. If 0>tz , tσ  is 
too high in relation to the other variables and will tend to decrease towards the 
equilibrium (provided that 0)1( >A ), and vice versa for 0<tz .  The more out of 
equilibrium the cointegrated variables are, the stronger the forcs that push them back 
towards it.   
Testing for cointegration is equivalent to testing whether tz  has a unit root.  
There are two different ways of obtaining an estimate for tz .  One is to estimate 
(3.12) and compute an estimate tz with the parameter estimates.  Another is to 
simply fit a linear regression of the allowance price on a constant, fuel prices and 
reservoir level deviations. 37 I will label he residuals of this regression tz
( . This 
                                                
36 For a derivation, see Johnston and Di Nardo (1997) 
37 This approach relies on the concept of superconsistency introduced by Engle and Granger 
(1991). A problem with this could be that superconsistency is strongly based on asymptotic 
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approach neglects all stationary exogenous variables, but (in theory) adding a 
stationary variable should have no impact on a unit root test.   
Standard critical values for unit root tests cannot be used in either case, 
because I don’t know tz  but only its prediction.  MacKinnon (1991) derived relevant 
critical values using Monte Carlo simulations.  For a system of 5 potentially 
integrated variables and a constant term, the critical values are -4.13 (10%), -4.42 
(5%) and -4.96 (1%).   
The cointegration test results are presented in Table 3.3.  The two approaches 
to compute the estimate for zt yield different results in terms of the actual values for 
tz  and tz
( , but for both series the null of a unit root cannot be rejected by a wide 
margin.  There appears to exist no cointegrating vector between the EUA and 
integrated fundamentals.  While no definitive proof, lack of cointegration between 
price and fundamentals is certainly consistent with a price bubble.   
 
3.4.d.)  Regime-switching test 
I carry out a regime switching test outlined by Hamilton (1989) and Engel and 
Hamilton (1990), and, among others, applied by van Norden and Schaller (1997, 
1996).  Kim and Nelson (1999) extended this class of tests to a state-spac  framework 
and a Bayesian analysis, but for the purpose of this paper, the tradition l approach 
                                                                                                                                           
properties, which may not be a practical assumption in finite samples (Johnston and DiNardo, 
1997). 
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suffices. The basic idea of a regime switching test is that not one, but two (or more) 
different distributions govern price changes.  In the bubbles context, a different 
distribution would be expected in the growth and in the bust phase. Regime switching 
is especially useful to detect a sequence of stochastically crshing bubbles where the 
transition between growth and bust is not known, but it can also be used to d tect a 
single bubble as long as both the growth and bust phase are included in the ata.  Let 
the variable )2,1(∈tS  refer to one of two states.  Allowance price changes can then 
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The variables whose influence on the allowance price is different in the two 
regimes are collected in the vector 1tX , whereas those with a stable impact across 
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is different for different values of tS .  Likewise, I allow the variance to vary across 































1 qpσσβββθ =  
by maximum likelihood using numerical methods as shown by (Engel ad H milton, 
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1990, Hamilton, 1989, Kim and Nelson, 1999).  Under the null hypothesis of no 
bubble, the state in period t-1 has no impact on the state in period t, which means that 
pq −= 1 . The likelihood ratio statistic to test the null is 
 ( ) ( )[ ] )(~loglog2 2 rLLLR RU χ−=  
where q  is forced to equal p−1  in the restricted (R) model but is left as a free 
parameter in the unrestricted (U) model, and r  is the number of parameters in the 
restricted model, in this case 3)(length)(length*2 21 ++= ββr .   
I estimate (3.14) based on model (3.10) plus an intercept for the entir per od 
as well as the pre-crash and post-crash subperiods.  I allow all fundamentals to 
influence the allowance price differently in the two states with the exception of the 
emissions verification dummy.  Results for the transition probabilities and the LR 
statistic are given in Table 3.4.38  The null of no state dependence is clearly rejected 
for all periods.   
These results imply the existence of (at least two) distinct regimes, and that 
the sequence of regimes is nonrandom.  Like the cointegration test, this is no 
conclusive proof for a bubble, but it is consistent with the presence of a one or a 
series of stochastically crashing bubbles.   
 
                                                
38 Full results available from the author upon request.   




In the first phase of the EU ETS, the allowance price exhibited high volatility 
and followed a peculiar path.  While the crash in April 2006 was clearly c used by an 
adjustment of expectations about aggregate emissions, it is not obvious what drove 
the price that high in the first place, and why it took so long to finally decrease to 
zero.  In this paper I examine if and to what extent the allowance pric  was 
consistently driven by market fundamentals.   
I set up a market model that relates the change in the allowance price to 
changes in fuel prices, temperature and reservoir level, under the assumption of 
efficient markets.  I estimate this model for the entire period, as well as for the 
subperiods before and after the allowance price crash.  I then relax th  model by first 
allowing for delayed adjustment to fundamentals, and then by including lagged price 
changes as predictors for current price changes.   
The specification that relies exclusively on contemporaneous and exogenous 
price drivers performs quite poorly, in spite of the fact that I’m using the best data 
available.  The introduction of lagged exogenous variables improves price predictions 
for the period before the price crash, but as soon as lagged EUA price changes are 
allowed in the model, all explanatory variables lose their significance with the 
exception of UK gas prices.   
Although lagged LHS variables are routinely used in time series analysis, it is 
important to ask what exactly a dependence of price on its own past me ns if the goal 
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is an analysis of price drivers.  Autocorrelation could be caused by an omitted 
autocorrelated exogenous variable, expectations about fundamentals or self-fulfilling 
expectations about future price changes that are not related to fundame tals.  The last 
situation is equivalent to a price bubble.  
In a price bubble, firms that held surplus allowances would be reluctant to sell 
because they expected future prices to increase.  For the same re son, buyers wanted 
to buy sooner rather than later, driving prices to whatever level xpectations 
happened to be.  The presence of a price bubble would in effect destroy the prime 
advantage of a permit market, which is the achievement of a given emissions cap at 
least cost, because the inflated permit price is at least partially passed on to 
consumers.  
I examine this hypothesis further by carrying out two bubbles test, one based 
on cointegration between the EUA price and market fundamentals and the other on 
regime switching.  Both tests indicate that a price bubble, or a series of bubbles, is 
consistent with the data.  The positive test results add another layer of evidence to the 
bubbles hypothesis, especially since market fundamentals in a permit market are 
better known than in the typical context of bubbles tests, which so far have been 
almost exclusively been applied to stock markets.   
To formulate it the other way around, in order for these results not to indicate 
the presence of a price bubble in EU ETS allowances, there must either exist a crucial 
but as of yet unrecognized fundamental price driver whose realizations tally with the 
peculiar price movement of the EUA, or expectations about fundamentals had to be 
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extreme enough (and, in hindsight, far away from actual realizations) to account for 
this price variation.  In the absence of either of these two –in my view unlikely- 
scenarios, one would have to conclude that the first phase of the EU ETS indeed was 
characterized by one or a series of speculative price bubbles.   
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Although market power in permit markets has been examined in detail 
following the seminal work of Hahn (1984), the effect of free allocati n on price 
manipulation with market power in both output and permit market has not specifically 
been addressed.  I show that in this case, the threshold for free allocation above which 
dominant firms find it profitable to increase the permit price is below their emissions.  
In addition to being of general economic interest, this issue is relevant in the context 
of the EU ETS, where it appears that power producers profited from a high permit 
price.  Because power producers were net permit buyers, Hahn’s results imply that 
market power in this sector could not have been involved.  My results change this 
conclusion.  Using data from the UK and German power markets, I find that power 
generators received free allowances well in excess of the derived threshold.   
 
Keywords: Market power, emissions permit markets, air pollution, EU ETS, CO2, 
electricity generation, permit allocation, windfall profits, cost pass-through.   
JEL classification: H23, L11-13, L94, L98, Q48, Q52-54, Q58  




During the first eighteen months of the European Union Emissions Trading 
Scheme (EU ETS), the allowance price per ton of CO2 was far above ex-ante 
expectations. It fell to one-half of its value in April 2006 after the first round of 
emissions verifications showed the market to be long and eventually re ched zero by 
mid 2007, but it is not clear what drove the price so high in the first place. A series of 
studies (Alberola, et al., 2008, Bunn and Fezzi, 2007, Mansanet-Bataller, et al., 2007, 
Rickels, et al., 2007) has tried to empirically explain the price path by market 
fundamentals such as fuel prices and weather variables, but only with limited success 
as fundamentals appear to only account for a small fraction of the allowance price 
variation. Especially the very high price levels before the April price crash lack a 
satisfactory explanation.   
An inflated permit price in the sense that it is above marginal ab tement costs 
of the market as a whole destroys the most powerful argument in favor of instituting 
pollution permit markets, which is to achieve a given emissions target t least cost. 
The increased costs are due to over-abatement on behalf of any firm that does set its 
marginal abatement cost equal to the permit price, and to consumers paying too high 
prices for pollution control if permit prices are passed through in the output market.   
In this paper, I examine whether price manipulation within the EUʼs power & 
heat sector could have been a cause of the apparent allowance price inflation. I extend 
economic theory by setting up a model that allows for market power in both the 
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output and the permit market and explicitly accounts for a link between these 
markets. I derive the conditions under which a dominant firm will exercise its market 
power to increase the permit price in order to maximize overall p ofits in both 
markets. Finally, I apply my theory results to data from the EU ETS and show that 
these conditions were fulfilled, i.e. provided that such “double” market power existed, 
it would have led to an inflation of both permit and output price.   
The interplay between permit and output market is at the root of what has 
become known as “windfall profits” in the empirical literature. If firms are able to 
pass through pollution costs to consumers but receive most (or all) permits allocated 
for free, they get reimbursed for costs they never had to incur. Windfall profits have 
been identified as an issue in permit markets in general (Bovenberg and Goulder, 
2000, Vollebergh et al., 1997), and in particular in the EU ETS (Grubb and Neuhoff, 
2006, Hepburn et al., 2006, Neuhoff et al., 2006, Sijm et al., 2006, Smale et al.,
2006). Such profits constitute a wealth transfer from consumers to firms but they do 
not impact efficiency directly39 nor affect the permit price in a competitive market. 
This no longer holds under the presence of market power in both the output and 
permit market, because a price-setting firm will take windfall profits into account 
when making its production and permit purchase decisions.   
One of the best-known results about market power in permit markets is Hahnʼs 
(1984) finding that the permit price is an increasing function of the dominant firm̓s 
                                                
39 Handing out permits for free impacts efficiency through existing distortions such as income 
taxes. In theory, the revenue from a tax or selling permits has to be recycled through lower 
distortionary taxes to achieve (Bovenberg and Goulder, 1996, Parry, 1995).   
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permit allocation. If this firm is a net buyer of permits, it will exert its power to 
decrease the permit price in order to minimize compliance costs, and vice versa. 
Other studies have confirmed and extended these findings (Isaac and Holt, 1999, 
Liski and Montero, 2005, Maeda, 2003, Westskog, 1996). Hahnʼs results imply that a 
dominant firm in the power & heat sector could not possibly have used it  market 
power to increase the allowance price, because this sector was underprovided with 
permits and thus, if anything, would have used its power to decrease the price.   
Hahn derived his results by focusing exclusively on the permit market while 
ignoring any distortions in the output market. However, if a firm has m rket power in 
the permit market, it is likely to also perceive market power in the output market.40 
Misiolek and Elder (1989) introduced exclusionary manipulation whereby the 
dominant firm intends to drive competitors out of the output market by manipulating 
the permit price, an approach also followed by von der Fehr (1993) and Godby 
(2000). A series of lab experiments empirically tested the relevance of combining 
market power in the output and permit markets (Cason et al., 2003, Godby, 2002, 
Muller and Mestelman, 1998). These studies found that a combination of market 
power in both markets increased the dominant firmʼs power to manipulate prices and 
that the overall effect on industry profits and consumer welfare depended on firmsʼ 
relative efficiencies and permit allocation and thus was ambiguous. However, they 
did not address whether and how Hahnʼs threshold of “neutral” allocation is altered 
                                                
40 If a permit market covers several industrial sectors, the firm’s market share in the permit 
market will be lower than its share in the output market, which implies market power in the 
latter market given market power in the former.   
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by the presence of market power in both permit and output market which are 
explicitly linked.   
The issue of double market power is closely related to the literatur  pertaining 
to “raising rivals̓ costs” (Hart and Tirole, 1990, Krattenmaker and Salop, 1986a, b, 
Ordover et al., 1990, Salop and Scheffman, 1987, 1983). The focus of this literature is 
the theory that predatory firms may increase their market share and overall profits by 
artificially increasing industry costs, given certain assumptions. This can take many 
forms, including the institution of mandatory standards, labeling, advertising etc, all 
of which are expected to be less costly on a per-output basis for the dominant firm 
than for the price-taking fringe. One particular version of raising r vals̓ costs is to 
over-purchase necessary inputs of production (Salop and Scheffman, 1987), which is 
a profitable strategy if the output price increase from this manipulation exceeds the 
firmʼs average cost increase.  Sartzetakis (1997) applied this framework specifically 
to emissions permits as a necessary input to production, but he refrained from 
examining how free allocation determines the existence and direction of price 
manipulation.41   
However, certain aspects of the interplay between market power in the output 
and an associated pollution permit market are not well captured by this literature. 
First, raising rivals̓ costs focuses on increasing profits of a dominant firm at the 
expense of rivals while decreasing overall industry profits. Profits from jointly 
                                                
41 Indeed, he mentions that a policy based on such a threshold would require full information 
and the “willingness to base permits allocation on efficiency rather than distributional 
considerations”. 
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manipulating output and permit prices on the other hand accrue to all firms in the 
industry and they come at the expense of consumers and taxpayers. In fact, fringe 
firms can free ride on the manipulative actions of the dominant firm as they enjoy 
increased profits without incurring the costs of price manipulation. Second, there are 
no strong assumptions needed about a dominant firmʼs efficiency relative to that of 
the fringe in order for price manipulation to be profitable: As I show below, even a 
dominant firm that is very inefficient at abating or producing can find it optimal to 
increase the permit price, given that it receives a sufficiently generous f ee allocation.   
In the next section I derive a threshold of free allocation beyond which a 
dominant firm will find it profitable to increase the permit price. The threshold is a 
function of the firm̓s market power in both markets as well as its emission intensty 
but is always below the full-allocation threshold defined by Hahn. Thisis my core 
result and means that a dominant firm may find it optimal to increase the permit price 
even if it is a net buyer of permits. I then apply this finding to the EU ETS and 
examine whether firms in the power & heat sector likely receiv d a free allocation in 
excess of this threshold, and therefore whether market power in this sector could be a 
cause for the high allowance price. Section 4.4 concludes.   
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4.2. Market power in output and permit market  
In the following I set up a simple model for an industry sector ontaining N 
firms that is subject to an emissions permit market.42  I define the cost function for 
firm i=1, ..., N as ),( ii
i eqC , a continuous function which depends on output iq  and 
emissions ei  and is twice differentiable in both arguments.  Costs are increasing in 







qeC  and ( ) 02 >− iqeieeiqq CCC .  I assume that firm 1 has 
market power in both the output and the permit market.43   
To study the equilibrium, I start by analyzing the behavior of firms i=2, …, N 
that comprise the price-taking fringe, before I move on to the dominant firm.  The 
















where p  is the output price, σ  the permit price, ix  refers to permit purchases and ix  
is firm i’s free permit allocation.  With a binding cap, I can substitute the constraint 
into the objective function and arrive at the familiar first-order conditions that 
                                                
42 This permit market may also include other sectors, but for simplicity I will confine the 
analysis to one sector.   
43 With a permit market that covers just one sector, assuming market power in one market but 
not the other seems arbitrary.  If the permit market covers many other sectors as well, then it 
is conceivable that a firm has market power in the output market but not the permit market.  
The converse, however, would not make economic sense.    
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marginal production costs equal the output price, and marginal abatement costs equal 
the permit price.  This implicitly defines the fringe’s optimal output, emissions and 


























The dominant firm takes (4.2) into account when maximizing its own profits.  


























where S is the overall emissions cap and q1 and x1 are the dominant firm’s output and 
permit purchase decisions, respectively.  This system of equations describes a fixed 
point with a mapping of [ ] ( )),(),,(),(),,( 11111111 xqxqpxqxqpF σσ → .  A unique 
solution exists if the vector ),( σp  belongs to a convex set (which is trivially true for 
prices), and ][ ⋅F  is upper-semicontinuous and monotone, which is assured by the 
continuity and monotonicity of the demand function )(QP  and the cost functions 
),( ii
i eqC .   
From equations (4.1)-(4.3) it follows that the output price and the permit p ice 
are both a function of the dominant firm’s output and permit purchase decisions:  













The impact of the dominant firm’s output and permit purchase decisions on 
the output and permit price can be assessed using comparative static calculations and 
is summarized in the following Lemma:  
 
Lemma 1:  
The dominant firm’s output and permit purchase decisions will influence 

























    (Proof: Appendix B) 
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    (x1 > 0)  
(4.4c) λ=⋅− )(1eC  
(4.4d) 0)(;0; 1111 =−≥≥ exex λλ  
The last first-order condition implies that the constraint may or may not be 
binding. To analyze the incentive of the firm to manipulate the permit price in either 














σ −−+⋅=⋅−  
where the asterisks indicate that the permit purchases and output are chosen optimally 
by the firm according to (4.4).  If with a permit price increas  the additional revenue 
from cost pass-through (the last term on the RHS) outweighs the higher permit 
purchase costs (the second term), then the firmʼs marginal abatement costs are below 
the permit price. This means that it will under-abate -or, equivalently, over-purchase 
permits-relative to the situation where it perceives no price-setting power through its 
permit purchase decision in either market44 ( 0// 11 == xpx ∂∂∂∂σ ) and thus push up 
the permit price.  Moreover, if the revenue effect outweighs the compliance cost 





BAU ≤= , 
                                                
44 Note that it still may perceive market power through its output decision. Equation (4.5) 
strictly applies to output and permit price manipulation through the permit purchase pathway.   
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where BAUe1  refers to business-as-usual (BAU) emissions in the absence of a permit 
market.  Conversely, if compliance costs outweigh increased revenue the firm will 
find it optimal to under-purchase permits in order to depress the permit p ice and 






































Condition (4.6) implies that there is a specific amount of free alloc tion that 
will cause the dominant firm to set its marginal abatement cos s equal to the permit 















This quantity is unambiguously smaller than the firm’s optimal permit 
purchases, provided that 01 <qeC .
45  Note that the firm’s optimal permit purchases and 
output are a function of its allocation, such that the threshold in (4.7) is difficult to 
compute ex-ante, except for very simple functional forms of the cost function and 
permit and electricity demand.  However, the threshold can be evaluated relatively 
                                                




1 xx =   
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easily ex-post when making some simplifying assumptions about consumer de and 
response (see below).46  Equations (4.6)-(4.7) lead to the following result:  
 
Result 1:  
After the market has been instituted and firms’ allocation, emissions and output 
decisions have been observed, we can infer that: 
a. If the dominant firm received a free permit allocation equal to 01x , it 
acted as a price taker in the permit market in the sense that it set its 
marginal abatement costs equal to the permit price.   
b. If the dominant firm’s allocation was greater (smaler) than 01x  its 
marginal abatement costs were below (above) the permit price and it 
manipulated the permit price upwards (downwards) by over- (under-) 
purchasing permits.  
c. The threshold allocation 01x  is smaller than the firm’s emissions and 
necessarily makes the firm a net buyer of permits.   
 
                                                
46 This caveat applies to some extent also to Hahn’s results.  Only if the firm’s cost function 
is known can the regulator compute its efficient emissions and thus determine Hx1 .  The 
difference is that in my setup, the regulator also needs to know the firm’s degree of market 
power and find a closed-form or numerical solution f r )( 1
*
1 xx .  I will leave the proof for 
the existence and uniqueness of such a solution for future work.   
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Result 1 is the core finding of this paper and states that even if the dominant 
firm is a net buyer of permits it can find it in its interest to manipulate the permit price 
upwards, provided that its allocation is sufficiently high.   
Note that this is a generalization of Hahnʼs result, which I will denominate as 
11 xx
H = :  A dominant firm will only abstain from manipulating the price if it 
receives exactly the number of allowances necessary to cover its missions and 
therefore does not trade. To see this, simply set 0/ 1 =xp ∂∂  in (4.6) or (4.7), thus 
eliminating the link between output and permit markets.  Also note that if the second 
term on the RHS on (4.7) is sufficiently large (i.e. if the impact of the firm’s permit 
purchases on output and permit price is sufficiently strong) then 001 <x .  In this case, 
even full auctioning would lead the firm to choose a permit price that is greater than 
its abatement costs.   
On the other hand, if a firm has been observed to emit more (less) than its 
initial permit allocation, Hahn's model would imply that the firms arginal abatement 
costs are below (above) the market price. My model therefore shows that this 
conclusion is premature if output markets are taken into account.   
So far I have focused on the effect of permit allocation on the permit price. 
However, as is clear from (4.3) and (4.4), the dominant firmʼs allocation also has an 
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With neither market power nor a permit market there would be the standard 
outcome that price equals marginal production cost, i.e. 1qCp = .  Market power in the 
output market increases the output price by the second term on the RHS, which is also 
a familiar result. The last term describes the effect of linking a permit market to the 
output market. Because 0/ 1 <q∂∂σ , this term decreases (increases) the output price 
if the firm is a net buyer (seller) of permits.  Substituting Hahn’s result of *11 xx
H =  
would cancel this third term, but it would not remove the output price distortion 
introduced by the second term.  To see how my generalized threshold 01x  performs in 
this case, I solve (4.5) for 1
*
































By construction, allocating 01x  to the dominant firm eliminates the last term, 
as in this case the marginal abatement costs are equal to the permit price. The third 
term on the RHS is negative and thus decreases output price distortion. However, the 
















>                                                   (Proof: Appendix B) 
It follows immediately that the output price can be rought to its efficient 
level only by allocating less than 01x  to the dominant firm, because in this case the 
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last term will be negative.  The threshold allocation to the dominant firm that yields 
1















The fact that 01
00
1 xx <  can easily be verified by using the inequality in (4.10).  
As before, due to the dependence of *1x  on 1x , this threshold can be evaluated ex-
ante only under very simple functional forms.  This leads to the following result:   
 
 
Result 2:  
After the market has been instituted and firms’ allocation, emissions and output 
decisions have been observed, we can infer that: 
a. If the dominant firm received an allocation of 001x , its marginal 
production costs were equal to the output price.   
b. If the firm received more (less) than 001x , marginal production costs 
were greater (smaller) than the output price.  
c. The threshold allocation x 1
00 is smaller than 01x .  
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The fact that marginal costs are equal to price in the two markets at two 
different levels means that efficiency cannot be restored completely.  Either the 
permit price is distorted, or the output price, or b th: 
 
Result 3:  
a. The first-best solution in the sense that both the output and the permit 
price are at their competitive levels cannot be achieved by means of 
permit allocation alone, because 01
00
1 xx < .  
b. If the firm received more than 01x  (less than 
00
1x ), both output and 
permit price were distorted upwards (downwards) relative to 
marginal costs.  If the firm’s allocation was 011
00
1 xxx << , the output 
price was above and the permit price below marginal costs.   
 
Results 1-3 imply that under the assumption of market power in both markets, 
the amount of free allocation is crucial for price distortion, and that Hahnʼs 
“neutralizing” allocation prescription will result in an inflation of both output and 
permit price.  In the following section I will empirically address the relevance of 
these findings in the context of the EU ETS.   
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4.3. Application to the EU ETS 
 
4.3.a.) General applicability 
Although the EU ETS covers six broad industry sectors, the main players both 
in terms of allocation and emissions are firms within t e power & heat sector. There 
is evidence that this sector was subject to significant windfall profits (Grubb and 
Neuhoff, 2006, Hepburn, et al., 2006, Neuhoff, et al., 2006, Sijm, et al., 2006), which 
sets the stage for price manipulation as analyzed in the previous section. According to 
market observers (e.g. Point Carbon), it was the sustained allowance purchases from 
power & heat, combined with a relatively short allowance supply from the other 
sectors, that drove the price to the –in hindsight-very high level. There are a number 
of very large power producers for which the assumption of some market power seems 
at least possible.   
On aggregate, firms in the power & heat sector were net demanders of 
allowances, whereas the other sectors covered by the EU ETS were over-allocated as 
a whole (Figs. 2.2-3). Hahnʼs results imply that in this case, price manipulation by 
dominant firms within this sector could not have been behind the allowance price 
increase, but as I show in section 4.2, this does nt hold if firms are able to influence 
both the output and the allowance price.  According to Result 1, a dominant firm 
would have found it optimal to use its market power to increase the allowance price 
even if it was a net buyer of allowances, as long as its free allocation exceeded x 1
0 .   




I will now address the question whether there is any evidence relating firms’ 
actual allocation to x 1
0 .  To do this, it will be convenient to introduce a substitution in 
notation. At x 1 = x 1
0 the emissions constraint will be binding such that x1 = e1 .  
Defining y 1 = x 1 /e1  to be the proportion of actual emissions that the dominant firm 






















The threshold in (4.7’) is exactly equivalent to 01x  as defined by (4.7), but 
instead of depending on the dominant firm’s output 1q  it now contains its emission 
intensity (average emissions per unit of output), denoted 1ρ .   
The main difficulty to empirical assessment of (4.7) is to determine the effect 
of a dominant firm’s permit purchase decisions on the output and the permit price.  
To get around this problem, I will use the fact that t e numerator on the RHS of (4.7’) 
is equivalent to the impact of the permit price on the output price if there is no 
demand response:47    
                                                
































I will argue that the short-term demand response for electricity by households 
is very small, as the most efficient means to reduc demand is to make changes in the 
portfolio of household appliances towards more energy- fficient items, which takes 
time.  Assuming no consumer demand response during the first 18 months of the EU 
ETS, I can substitute (4.12) into (4.7’).  The effect of the allowance price on the 
electricity price ( σddp / ) can be estimated by looking at the electricity spreads 
before and after the institution of the permit market relative to the allowance price.  I 
will do this separately using market data from the UK and Germany, two of the 
largest players in the EU ETS.   
 
4.3.b.) The UK power market 
Gas-fired power plants are at the margin during medium and peak hours in the 
UK and are therefore price setting during these loads (Grubb and Newbery, 2007).48  
Figure 4.1 shows year-ahead spark spreads and clean spark spreads in the UK.  The 
spark spread is the theoretical gross profit of a gas-fired power plant from selling a 
unit of electricity, having bought the fuel necessary to generate it:  
                                                
48 During base loads, the marginal generator is coal and nuclear for most hours, as they are 
generally ranked lower in the merit order than gas pl nts.   









ppspreadSpark η−=  
Here, p  refers to the power price as before, gasp  to the price for natural gas 
and η  to the heat rate (or efficiency).  The clean spark spread, also called green spark 
spread, further adjusts the revenue stream by the CO2 costs embedded in power 
generation:  
(4.14) gasspreadsparkspreadsparkClean ρσ *−=  
where gasρ  denotes the emission intensity of a typical gas plnt. Solving (4.14) for 






ρση =⇒−+= *  
At first sight, this seems to imply that the extent to which the electricity price 
is increased due to CO2 costs is simply the emissions intensity used to compute the 
clean dark spread.  However, these spreads are created as benchmarks and don’t 
imply that the emission intensity used in their calculation is necessarily the average 
emission intensity of the marginal generator in themarket.  In theory, one could 
calculate the clean spark spread for any type of generator.   
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To see how gasρ  relates to σddp /  it is useful to compare pre-market spark 
spreads with post-market clean spark spreads. With full cost pass-through,49 constant 
demand and stable technology, the clean spark spread will be equal to the pre-market 
spread if the “correct” emission factor is used in (4.14), i.e. if σρ ddpgas /= .  In 
other words, theoretical gross profits50 of a power producer will not change if the 
power price is increased by an amount exactly equivalent to the embedded carbon 
cost.   
Figure 4.1 shows almost precisely such a market.  Before the carbon market, 
UK spark spreads fluctuated around a level of £6-8.  In January 2004, the year-ahead 
spreads immediately incorporated the carbon cost of producing electricity based on 
the year-ahead forward price for CO2, with the spark spread increasing and the clean 
spark spread taking the place of the spark spread.  The equalization of pre-market 
spark spreads and post-market clean spark spreads implies that the CO2 costs 
embedded in the production of peak electricity are those that correspond to the 
allowance price multiplied by ρ g  used to calculate the clean dark spread, which is 
0.41 tCO2/MWh, the emission intensity of a typical Combined Cycle Gas Turbine 
(CCGT) (PointCarbon, 2007).  This means that in the UK, 
eMWhtCOddp g /41.0/ 2=≈ ρσ .  Naturally, this is an approximation as the clean 
spark spread has its own variation over time, and factors other than the allowance 
                                                
49 Assuming a completely inelastic demand, profit-maxi izing firms will pass their costs 
fully through to consumers.   
50 As discussed above, there may well be windfall profits due to the institution of the market 
because of free allocation.   
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price could potentially have affected the spreads.  However, the figure and other 
evidence (Grubb and Newbery, 2007, Vorspools, 2006) implies that electricity prices 
increased roughly by the amount that corresponds to carbon costs incurred by an 
average CCGT.   
I will now do the following back-of-the envelope cal ulation: Firms in the UK 
power sector on average received 77.1% of their emissions allocated for free.51  
Substituting a value of 0.77 for the UK, setting 41.0=σddp  and solving (4.7’) for 
the emission intensity, this means that it would have been profitable for dominant UK 
power firms to use their market power to increase the allowance price (and with it the 
electricity price) by over-purchasing allowances if 
(4.16) eMWhtCO /78.1)77.01(41.0 2=−<ρ  
In comparison, the emission intensity of an anthracite oal power plant (the 
most emission-intensive method of power generation used today in Europe) with a 
heat rate of 33.3%,52 is 1.06 tCO2 per MWh of output.  In other words, even the least 
efficient of all power production companies received an allocation in excess of 01y  (or 
0
1x ) and would have found it profitable to manipulate th  permit price upwards, 
provided that it had some market power.   
                                                
51 Power & heat generators with an allocation of at le st 100,000 allowances, based on 2005 
numbers.  This list is a subset of installations with activity code 1 (combustion) in the 
Community Independent Transaction Log (CITL). Many code-1 installations produce process 
power & heat only and are much smaller than power plants.  For all code 1 installations 
combined, the fraction of free allocation is even larger.   
52 Power plants with such a low heat rate are most likely not allowed to operate in the UK.   
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Note that this result is quite robust to what cost pass-through rate I substitute 
into the numerator of (4.7ʼ). The fact that companies received a free allocatin 
covering around 77 % of their emissions means that the inequality in (4.16) holds as 
long as a firm̓s emission intensity is smaller than (1/0.23=) 4.3 times the cost pass-
through rate. Also note that power companies in the UK received the least generous 
allowance allocation in the EU ETS.   
 
4.3.c.) The German power market 
Large power producers in Germany received an average of 99.5% of their 
actual emissions allocated for free, much more than their UK counterparts. 
Differences in allocation for firms in the same sector but different countries have 
raised discussions about the ability to achieve economic efficiency in a system where 
each member country is able to independently define its own National Allocation 
Plan (Boehringer and Lange, 2005a).  
In Germany, the marginal generator is a coal-fired power plant during most 
hours of the year, including the entire base load (Grubb and Newbery, 2007, Sijm, et 
al., 2006). German dark spreads and clean dark spreads are presented in Figure 4.2, 
along with their average (middle line). The dark spread is equivalent to the spark 
spread described above, but instead of gas it is applied to coal generation. Likewise, 
the clean dark spread is the dark spread adjusted for the CO2 emission costs inherent 
in coal generation. The heat rate and emission intesity used to calculate dark spreads 
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and clean dark spreads are 35% and 0.96 tCO2/MWh of output, respectively 
(PointCarbon, 2007).   
Cost pass-through was not immediate as in the UK, but 50% of carbon costs 
were passed through after one year, as indicated by the center line reaching the pre-
market level of €10/MWh. By January 2006, the clean d rk spread reached the pre-
market dark spread level, implying that by then the carbon costs embedded in coal 
generation had been fully passed through to consumers. Again, the movement of 
clean dark spreads towards pre-market dark spread levels could include reasons other 
than CO2 cost, but the figure implies that some cost pass-through was very likely.   
Suppose now that cost pass-through on average was 0.5* cρ , where cρ  is the 
carbon intensity of coal generation used for the calcul tion of the green dark spread.  
Substituting this value along with an allocation of 99.5 % into (4.7’) reveals that 
German power firms with market power would have found it profitable to inflate the 
allowance price if their emission intensity was below 
 eMWhtCO /96)995.01(96.0*5.0 2=−<ρ  
which is trivially the case for any power company.  The choice of pass-through rate 
(and the assumption of zero demand response) is even l ss important here than for the 
UK, because almost any positive cost pass-through rate multiplied by (1/0.005=) 200 
will lead to a number that exceeds real-world emission intensities.   
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Naturally, these calculations do not show in any wath t electricity producers 
in the UK or in Germany actually had market power in both the output and permit 
market, and used this power to inflate the allowance price. But they do show that 
assuming that some firms had market power, 1.) they would have found it profitable 
to over-purchase allowances and under-abate emissions in order to inflate the permit 
price, because the ensuing increase in the electricity price would have more than 
compensated them for increased allowance purchase costs, and 2.) this would have 
lead to an electricity price increase relative to asituation with less free allocation.   
 
4.4.  Conclusions 
There is a large literature about market power in permit markets, but, to my 
knowledge, no paper has directly addressed the effect of free allocation on price 
manipulation in the presence of market power in both permit market as well as the 
linked output market. Besides being of general economic interest, this particular 
question is motivated by a very high (in hindsight too high) allowance price during 
the first phase of the EU ETS, which reportedly ledto large windfall profits 
especially for firms in the power & heat sector. These firms received most of their 
allowances for free but were able to pass through a large part of the opportunity costs 
to consumers. The reason for the apparent price inflation is not clear to date, but the 
presence of windfall profits (which are increasing  the permit price) and the history 
of imperfect competition in the power & heat sector raises the question whether 
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dominant power producers could have used their market weight in order to increase 
the permit price.   
According to Hahn̓s (1984) well-known results, the answer to this question is 
clearly negative, because power & heat is the only sector that was under-allocated 
with permits and thus was a net allowance buyer. In Hahn̓s framework, any dominant 
permit buyer would depress rather than inflate the permit price, and would act 
competitively only when given the exact amount of free allocation that covers its 
emissions.  
In this paper, I show that Hahnʼs results no longer hold with market power in 
both markets. I derive the threshold of free allocati n above which the dominant firm 
finds it profitable to under-abate and over-purchase llowances in order to push up 
the permit price.  This threshold is a function of c st pass-through and firmsʼ average 
emission intensity and is always less than a firmʼs emissions were it to set its marginal 
abatement costs equal to the permit price.   
These findings are not subject to stringent assumptions about relative 
efficiency in production and/or abatement among firms, as is typically the case in the 
raising rivals̓ costs literature that discusses market manipulation in input and output 
markets.  Firms do not profit at the expense of their industry rivals but that of 
consumers via the increased output price.  In fact, the industry fringe profits from 
market manipulation on behalf of the dominant firm, as its revenue increases as well.   
I apply my theoretical results to the UK and German power market. Using 
market evidence, I show that power generators in these countries received an 
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allocation in excess of x1
0  and would therefore have been interested in increasing the 
allowance price, provided they had the ability to do so. In the UK, this result is due to 
an almost complete and immediate cost pass-through, whereas in Germany costs were 
passed through more slowly and/or less completely. However, because of the very 
generous allocation to German power generators, almost any positive pass-through 
rate would have made it profitable for them to manipulate the permit price upwards.   
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Chapter 5:  An Options Pricing Approach to CO2 Allowances in 
the EU ETS 
 
Abstract 
The EU ETS was set up very quickly, which could have made it impossible 
for firms to adjust their production technology befor  the end of Phase I.  I derive an 
allowance pricing formula under the assumption thatabatement was infeasible, which 
renders the allowance price a function of the penalty for noncompliance and the 
probability that the cap turns out to be binding.  This is the pricing formula of a 
binary option, with the underlying process being CO2 emissions.  The options pricing 
formula depends on the mean and variance of future emissions.   
I define the processes driving (stochastic) emissions and estimate their 
parameters using market data.  I then incorporate these parameter estimates into the 
options pricing formula and estimate the remaining free parameters.  The results 
make economic sense, and the model fits the data resonably well.  This implies that 
allowance prices may indeed not have been determined by marginal abatement costs 
during the first market phase.   
 
Keywords: Emissions permit markets, air pollution, CO2, climate change, options 
pricing, asset pricing, EU ETS.   
JEL classification: G12, G14, G18, Q52, Q53, Q54 




5.1  Introduction 
The centerpiece of emissions permit market theory is that firms equate their 
marginal abatement costs to the permit price.  Intuitively, if a firm finds it cheaper to 
abate an additional unit of emissions than what a permit is worth, it will make a profit 
from abating and either buy one fewer or sell one more permit on the market.  
Likewise, if the firm finds that purchasing a permit on the market is cheaper than to 
abate another unit of emissions, it will not abate but use the market to reach 
compliance. The efficient solution of this arbitrage ame is that all firms abate exactly 
to the point where their marginal abatement costs are equal to the permit price.   
However, this leaves out two important possibilities: For one, firms don’t 
know exactly what their emissions are going to be, even if they are engaging in 
abatement, if abatement consists of reducing emission  per unit of (stochastic) output.  
And second, abatement may not be feasible, or at leas not practical, for the involved 
firms in the short run.  Most permit markets to date, including the EU ETS, impose a 
penalty for noncompliance:  For every unit (usually  ton) of emissions for which the 
firm cannot surrender a permit, it is fined a penalty; in addition, the missing permits 
have to be surrendered in the following year.   
In this paper I will address precisely this question:  Was the allowance price in 
the EU ETS determined predominantly by firms looking with one eye to the penalty 
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and with the other on the realized emissions to date and the expected emissions to 
come?   
I develop an allowance pricing formula using options pricing techniques that 
does not incorporate abatement, but instead relies on the penalty and expected overall 
emissions levels as price drivers.  While eliminatig abatement from the problem is 
mainly intended to simplify the calculations, one can also argue that this assumption 
is quite realistic for the following reasons:  
First, the timely construction of cleaner production technology (e.g. more 
efficient power plants) was largely infeasible befor  the end of the first phase.  The 
market was set up at a very rapid speed, with only a little over year between its legal 
conception and the start of the first phase.  Some EU member countries did not 
finalize their national allocation plans (NAPs) until mid 2005, which created 
considerable uncertainty about the total cap and the resulting allowance price.  
Uncertainty over the return of irreversible investment delays such investment.53  
Besides, even under complete certainty, many new plants simply take longer than 4 
years (the time between the inception of the market and the end of the first phase) to 
plan and construct.   
In the absence of cost-effective technology that filters CO2 from exhaust 
gases, this leaves essentially only fuel switching as a method of abatement (Alberola, 
et al., 2008, Bunn and Fezzi, 2007, Mansanet-Bataller, et al., 2007, Rickels, et al., 
                                                
53 For a thorough treatment of investment under uncertainty and the ensuing option value of 
waiting, see Dixit and Pindyck (1994).   
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2007, Sijm, et al., 2006).  However, energy-intensive industries are typically locked 
into long-term contracts.  It is questionable whether firms were able to adjust these 
contracts in time (Chesney and Taschini, 2008), and/or whether they were willing to 
do so, considering the large uncertainty about future caps.   
Second, firms probably anticipated that their first-phase emissions were going 
to be used to guide the distribution of second-phase allowances.  The EC vehemently 
argued against this and repeatedly promised that this was not going to be the case, but 
it happened nevertheless: Most EU member countries based their second-phase NAPs 
on verified 2005 emissions.  One possible reason for this –from an economic point of 
view highly inefficient- choice is the scarcity of information about historic emissions 
in the EU, which made it almost impossible for the EU member countries to fight the 
temptation to use the information gained from the first round of emissions 
verification.  Basing future allocation on current emissions creates a disincentive to 
abate, because every unit of abatement comes causes not only costs in the current 
period (e.g. due to fuel switching) but also a reduction in future free allocation 
(Boehringer and Lange, 2005b).   
Third, aggregate emissions were below the total cap for each individual year 
of the market.54 An allowance surplus by itself does not automatically mean that there 
was no abatement, especially during the first 16 months of the market when the 
allowance price was very high and actual emissions had yet to be verified (Ellerman 
                                                
54 During the first phase as a whole, the cap and total emissions were 6.250 and 6.081 billion 
tons, respectively. The allowance surplus of 168 million tons corresponds to about 2.7 % of 
the cap.   
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and Buchner, 2006).  On the other hand, it is precisely the beginning of the market 
that was especially constrained in terms of building new infrastructure and adjusting 
long-term fuel contracts.  And last but not least, I found no consistent correlation 
between allowance prices and commonly identified abatement price drivers (see 
Chapter 3 of this Dissertation).  For all these reasons, the assumption of no abatement 
during the first phase may not be far from the truth.   
The purchase of an allowance gives the bearer the option to use it for 
compliance at the end of the period, or, equivalently, to sell it.  However, if the cap 
turns out to be not binding, the bearer can retire the allowance.  In other words, the 
holder has the right, but not the obligation to use th  allowance.  This makes an 
allowance a financial option.  Specifically, the payoff function is that of a type of 
binary option called a cash-or-nothing call option.  There exist well-established 
pricing formulae for binary options if the underlying asset follows a lognormal 
distribution.  I develop a pricing formula based ontwo normally distributed 
underlying processes, namely electricity consumption and precipitation.   
The fact that allowances can be viewed as financial options is neither 
remarkable in itself nor new.  A handful of studies have used financial methods to 
either predict allowance prices themselves, or to price options on allowances.  
However, to my knowledge, no one has used observed allowance prices and then 
used options pricing formulas to back out the underlying parameters.   
In Section 5.2 I give some more background and derive an options pricing 
formula for EU ETS allowances as a function of past nd future emissions in the 
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power & heat sector, the cap, the penalty for noncompliance and a set of free 
parameters.  This pricing formula contains the mean and variance of expected future 
emissions between the current day and the end of the market, which I derive in 
Section 5.3 as a function of exogenous stochastic pro esses.  Section 5.4 contains 
empirical estimates for these underlying processes a  well as estimates for the free 
parameters in the options pricing formula.  Section 5.5 concludes.   
 
5.2.  Emission allowance pricing in the absence of abatement 
5.2.a.) Literature on permit pricing 
Historically, permit pricing formulas were derived by solving an optimal 
control problem, originating with Montgomery (1972).  This was later extended to the 
dynamic case (Leiby and Rubin, 2001), to incorporate banking and borrowing 
(Cronshaw and Brown-Kruse, 1996, Rubin, 1996) and to address uncertainty 
(Schennach, 2000, Zhao, 2003) and to some extent volatility (Newell et al., 2005).  
But it was not until recently that financial methods have been employed to derive 
emissions permit prices.   
Kosobud et al. (2005) introduced financial tools to the analysis of SO2 permits 
in the US Acid Rain program.  Other contributions that approach permit markets and 
the efficient price of an allowance from a financial perspective include Benz and 
Trueck (2006) and Fehr and Hinz (2006).  Seifert et al (2008) explicitly mention the 
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option value of a permit when compared with the alternative of irreversible 
investment in emissions abatement.  Chesney and Taschini (2008) go one step further 
and define EU ETS allowances to be financial (as opposed to “real” options) and 
derive a pricing formula that comes close to options pricing.  However, all of these 
approaches start with the definition of underlying pollution processes, and then derive 
a market-clearing permit price by method of simulation.  This allows for valuable 
insights in terms of price volatility and hedging strategies, but it does not address the 
question of what actually drives permit prices.  Mypaper intends to fill this gap by 
taking the allowance price series in the EU ETS as given and test whether it is 
consistent with a model that is based on options pricing techniques, and, in particular, 
whether it was driven by the penalty of noncompliance and the probability that the 
cap would turn out to be binding.   
 
5.2.b.) Derivation of option pricing formula 
Let tP  be the closing price for an allowance on day t, with the day index 
),...,2,1( Tt =  starting on January 1, 2005, and ending at t =T on December 31, 2007.    





 cumulative emissions 




t gG 1  cumulative future emissions 
until the end of the market.  It follows from these d finitions that at time t, tG1  is 
observed and TtG  is stochastic.  Furthermore, let P be the penalty for noncompliance 
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and 0S  be the total emissions cap over the entire market period imposed by the 
regulator.  Finally, it will also be useful to define tt GSS 10 −=  to be the “remaining 
cap” until the end of the market.   
At time T, the price of an allowance is zero if emissions are below the cap, or 
equal to the penalty if the cap turned out to be binding.  Naturally, if the cap is 
already exceeded at time t<T, the probability that e allowance price is equal to the 



















The penalty is the sum of the per-unit penalty and the cost of buying an 
additional permit for the second phase, for which I use the forward price of second-




At t<T, it is not known with certainty whether the cap will be exceeded, 
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where )( Ttt Gζ  denotes the probability density function over cumulative future CO2 
emissions and ][ ⋅tE  stands for the expectation taken using all information available at 
time t.  Note that equation (5.2) is very similar to an equation derived by Chesney and 
Taschini (2008).   
I will assume that daily emissions gt  are normally distributed.
55  As I will 
argue below, emissions are a linear function of underlying normally distributed AR(1) 
processes, meaning that the assumption of normally distributed emissions is really an 
assumption about normally distributed underlying processes.  Because TtG  represents 
the summation of random events kg  for tk > , it follows that 
T
tG  is normally 
distributed as well.  I will denote the mean and standard deviation as tµ  and ts , 












has a standard normal distribution.  Let )(⋅ϕ  and )(⋅Φ  be the probability density 
function (pdf) and cumulative probability density function (cdf) of the standard 
                                                
55 In theory, the choice of a normal distribution makes a truncation at zero necessary since 
negative emissions are not defined.  But because CO2 emissions in the EU are many standard 
deviations away from zero, the correction implied by the truncation is very small, such that 
for the remainder of this paper I will neglect the runcation issue and assume that emissions 
are normally distributed.  Note that this assumption is similar to that of demographers who 
assume that people’s height is normally distributed.   
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normal distribution, respectively.  I now convert the integral in (5.3) into an integral 


























Arbitrage considerations dictate that the price at time t be equal to the 
expected price at T, discounted by the risk-free rat  of interest r.56  The same 




−= .  This means that the allowance price is a martingale 






























                                                
56 Real-world markets are typically not risk-neutral, but option prices based on risk neutrality 
nevertheless yield the correct (meaning no-arbitrage) solution for traded assets (Hull, 2002).  
Risk aversion may be more important for the pricing of non-traded assets such as the weather 
or electricity demand, but the price of market risk can never be measured with a sufficient 
degree of confidence in order to make its inclusion in a pricing formula worthwhile, due to 
measurement and identification issues (e.g. a greater market fundamental and a higher price 
of risk have the same effect on the price). In absence of a convincing prior for market risk, I 
will omit the latter in my analysis.   
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This is the option pricing formula for a cash-or-nothing call option based on a 
normally distributed underlying asset or process.    
Given knowledge of past emissions tG0 , the overall cap 0S , the forward price 
penalty IIPhasetP  and the interest rate r, and estimates for the mean tµ  and standard 
deviation ts  of future emissions at every point in time, an estima e for the allowance 
price tP̂  can be computed for reach day, and the resulting time series compared with 
the observed series tP  for Tt ...,,2,1= .  A situation where the two series correspond to 
one another would be interpreted as evidence that the allowance price was driven by 
emissions and the penalty, but not abatement.   
What remains to be determined in order to evaluate (5.6) are past emissions 
and the mean and standard deviation of cumulative future emissions.  These are not 
directly observed, but have to be derived from underlying processes and ultimately 
estimated using market data.  This is the subject of the following section.   
 
5.3.  Deriving the mean and standard deviation of future emissions 
5.3.a.) CO2 emissions as a function of exogenous stochastic processes 
Emissions are verified only once a year, and there exists no direct data about 
daily emissions.  However, for the power and heat sc or (which is by far the most 
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important in the EU ETS) here is something that comes close: Daily electricity 
consumption.   
Electricity is special in the sense that demand has to be met with a matching 
supply at all times in order for the grid not to crash.  I will make the simplifying 
assumption of zero short-term demand elasticity of electricity.  This makes electricity 
demand an exogenous process driven by stochastic elements such as the weather.57   
More precisely, it is not generation of electricity n general that drives CO2 
emissions, but generation of electricity using conventional thermal generators by 
burning fossil fuels like coal and natural gas.  Thus, daily emissions are a function of 
consumer demand, as well as the availability of “clean” (i.e. non-CO2-emitting) 
sources of energy, mainly hydroelectric and nuclear power.58  Hydroelectric 
generation depends on rainfall and varies within and between years, but nuclear 
generation is largely constant due to prohibitively high start-up costs.   
Let c t  represent overall electricity consumption; c t
c consumption of 
conventional fossil-fueled generation;  nuclear power generation (all in Giga-Watt-
hours (GWh) per day); and ht  rainfall in the EU in millimeters (mm) per day, 
weighted by installed hydroelectric capacity.  Assuming that all available 
                                                
57 In the long run, consumers will react to higher elctricity prices by changing their 
consumption habits and appliance portfolio, such that electricity demand is also a function of 
the electricity price.  But regardless of the time horizon, exogenous weather shocks will 
always drive short-term consumption.   
58 Although wind generation has increased rapidly during the past few years, it still accounts 
for a relatively small fraction of total power production.   
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hydroelectric and nuclear power is used (i.e. that t ey are lowest in the merit order59), 
demand for conventional generation can be expressed as  
(5.7) nhcc tt
c
t −−= η  
where η is a fixed coefficient translating precipitation into hydroelectric power.   
Since precipitation can be stored to some extent, either in reservoirs or as 
snow in the mountains, there is no immediate relationship between precipitation and 
hydro generation on any given day, which makes a regression of hydro output on 
daily precipitation impractical.  On the long run, however, all net hydro generation is 
ultimately due to precipitation, and even though rainfall today may not translate into 
more generation today, it nevertheless reduces expected conventional generation 
needed to satisfy consumer electricity demand untilthe end of the market.  I compute 
the precipitation-to-rainfall conversion factor η by dividing the EU’s total hydro 
generation60 in 1990-2005 of 4,852,339 GWh by cumulative weighted precipitation 
over the same period of 9,775.28 mm, using installed hydroelectric capacity per 
country as weights.  This results in a conversion factor of η=496.389 GWh/mm.   
In the EU, 12 member countries have nuclear power plants (BE, CZ, DE, ES, 
FI, FR, HU, NL, SK, SL, SW, UK).  Their average total output in the years 2003-
2005 was 2,679 GWh per day, which I will use as a me sure for n .   
                                                
59 The merit order is the sequence by which individual generators are brought online and is 
usually based on marginal cost.   
60 From World Development Indicators database, World Bank.   
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The emission intensity (in CO2/GWh) of the marginal generator varies with 







where )( ctcΨ  is an emission intensity function transforming conve tional thermal 
power generation into CO2 emissions.  To compute the integral in (5.8) I would need 
to know the exact dispatch order and the marginal emission intensity of all generators 
involved, which is information that is not readily available.  Instead, I assume that the 
emission intensity of the marginal generators (i.e.all generators that are not running 















The parameter γ  translates fossil-fueled electricity generation into CO2 
emissions.  Κ  is a constant defined as the difference between CO2 emissions 
associated with minimum thermal generation ming  and the (theoretical) emissions if 
the emission intensity γ  were applicable to the inframarginal generation.61    
                                                
61 In theory, the average emission intensity of inframarginal generation could be greater or 
smaller than the emission intensity of marginal generation. For example, if inframarginal 
generation consists to a large part of lignite or anthracite coal power plants, then K>0, but if it 
exists largely of efficient generators such as combined cycle gas turbines (CCGTs) that are 
low in the dispatch order due to their small marginal costs, then K<0.  In the EU, the former 
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Combining (5.7) and (5.9), daily CO2 emissions can be expressed as  
(5.10) )(* nhcg ttt −−+Κ= ηγ  
In this specification, emissions are a function of a set of parameters and the 
two stochastic and exogenous processes tc  and th .  The properties of tg , and thus of 
tµ  and ts , are therefore a function of the properties of tc  and th .  At time s, the 















































The calculation of the variance of future emissions is a little more 












































                                                                                                                                  
is much more likely given the large number of lignite plants in Germany and the new EU 
member countries from Eastern Europe.   
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Both expressions are functions of the constants η  and n , the parameters K  
and γ , the mean and variance of electricity consumption and precipitation, and the 
covariance of electricity consumption and precipitation between different days.   
I defined the constants η and n  above and will treat them as known; K and 
γ  will enter the estimation as free parameters.  The derivation of the mean, variance 
and covariance of electricity consumption and rainfall is the subject of the next 
subsection.   
 
5.3.b.) Properties of the stochastic processes ct and ht 
For the definition of the stochastic processes of electricity demand and 
precipitation, I will draw extensively from a paper by Peter Alaton, Boualem 
Djehiche and David Stillberger (2002).  Although their analysis focuses on pricing a 
weather option over heating-degree days with the underlying process being 
temperature, it is very similar in principle to both electricity demand and 
precipitation, as both are exogenously driven stochastic processes that contain 
deterministic annual fluctuation and long-term trends.  The contribution of my paper 
is not the derivation of the property of such processes, but the application of these 
methods to model CO2 emissions and, ultimately, to CO2 allowance pricing.   
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I will model both electricity consumption and precipitation diffusion 
processes62 consisting of a deterministic mean and a stochastic part, and which exhibit 
mean-reversion.63  For mathematical tractability, I include the stochastic element in 
the form of a generalized Wiener process.   Combining the processes in the index x, 















−+= σ  
This is known as an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process witha non-zero mean and 
time-varying volatility.64  The term in brackets represents the drift of the processes, 
followed by the diffusion term defined by the standrd Wiener process xtdW  times 
the corresponding volatility. The first element of the drift term in (5.13) is due to the 
fact that mean consumption and precipitation change throughout the year.  The mean 
reversion parameters ax measure the speed at which the processes revert back o their 
long-term mean.   
I constrain the volatility to be constant within each calendar month, but allow 
it to differ across months.  The index i  labels the month to which the time index t 
                                                
62 A diffusion process is the solution to a stochastic differential equation. In particular, it is a 
continuous-time Markov-process with a continuous sample path.  This is a realistic 
description for electricity consumption and precipitation and makes the derivation and 
exposition easier, but the market and weather data discrete are naturally only available for 
discrete points in time.   
63 Mean reversion is a commonly observed characteristic in many naturally occurring 
processes, as they generally do not grow without bonds and eventually return to their long-
term mean.   
64 See, for example, Bibby and Sorensen (1995).   
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refers.  For reasons of data availability (see below) I will start this index at 1 in 













Because I assume that the volatility is the same for each calendar month, it 
must be that ]12*[][ kii += σσ  for any integer k .   


















The parameters x0β  and 
x
1β  ( hcx ,= ) describe the level and trend of the two 
process, respectively, whereas x2β  describe the amplitudes of the respective sine 
waves.  The phase angles xω  shift the oscillation of the two processes to their correct 
position.  Lastly, the vector of coefficients cD  (not applicable to rainfall) accounts 
differences in electricity consumption across different weekdays, and tWD  is a vector 
of weekday dummies.   
Equation (5.13) describes two stochastic differential equations.  At time ts ≤ , 
their solution is65 
                                                
65 See, for example, Øksendahl (2007) Chapter 2.   










xx ,;)]([)( )()( =++−= ∫ −−−− ττ τσ  
The first term on the RHS is the deviation of actual consumption/precipitation 
at the present time s from its mean.  As time goes on, the impact of this deviation will 
diminish due to the mean-reversion property of both processes, measured by the 
exponent.  If one of the processes is at its average at time s, or if st >> , then the first 
term will drop out, and the expectation at time t simply becomes the mean 
expectation mtx  defined by (5.14).    













































The second equality follows from the fact that [ ] dtdWE xt =2)( .  If the 
volatility does not change between s and time t, (5.17) can be solved to  
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If s and t are not within the same month, the expression becomes more 
complicated.  I will denote the first day of each month as { }itittit == )(:min)]([min .  
In Appendix C (Result 2) I show that for hcx ,=  and )()( tisi ≤ , the general 



























xx σσσσ  
It is easy to verify that if the volatility is the same for each month, (5.19) 
collapses to (5.18).   
To calculate the covariance between electricity consumption and rainfall on 
the same day, note that dtdWdWE chht
c
t ρ=][ , where 
][*][/],[ tttt
ch hVarcVarhcCov≡ρ  is the correlation coefficient between the two 
processes.  Thus,  
 





































Analogous to the procedure used for the variance, this can be solved to  
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Lastly, the covariance between electricity consumption/precipitation on day t 






























Expressions (5.16) and (5.19)-(5.21) can now be substit ted into (5.11) and 
(5.12).  In the following section I obtain empirical parameter estimates for 
ch
x
cxxxx aD ρωβββ ,,,,,, 210  and )(ixσ .   
 
5.4.  Estimation 
There are two different steps in the estimation.  The final goal is to express 
equation (5.6) as a function of data, known constant , and a set of free parameters, 
and calculate these free parameters using market data.  Since most countries lack 
daily electricity consumption data prior to 2006, I will evaluate (5.6) for the period 
between January 1, 2006 and December 31, 2007.   
Because in January 2006, realizations of electricity consumption and 
precipitation for later days were not yet known, I estimate tµ  and ts  using data 
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through 2005 only, with some exceptions where necessary.  In theory I could update 
the estimates for every day, but for simplicity I will use pre-2006 data.   
 
5.4.a.) Data 
Daily data about electricity consumption is available from the Union for the 
Coordination of Transmission of Electricity (UCTE)66 for continental European 
countries, including all EU member states except for the Nordic countries,67 the UK, 
Ireland, the Baltic States, Malta and Cyprus.  Electricity consumption has been 
measured on every third Wednesday of each month68 since 1994 for 9 EU countries, 
since 1996 for Germany and since 1999 for another 5 EU countries.  Weekend 
consumption is available for every Weekend following the third Wednesday of each 
month in the year 2000.  Starting in January 2006, electricity consumption is 
available on a daily basis for all UCTE countries.  To supplement the UCTE data I 
obtained all available historic electricity consumption data directly from the 
transmission system operators (TSOs) in the UK, Ireland and the Nordic countries.69  
                                                
66 Available at www.ucte.org, last accessed in September 2008.   
67 Sweden, Denmark and Finland. Note that Norway is not part of the EU, and although it is 
now linked to the EU ETS, this was not the case during the first phase of the market.   
68 Wednesdays are supposed to be the most typical weekdays (as opposed to Mondays and 
Fridays, which may be slightly different), and the ird week is supposed to be the typical 
week of a month.   
69 UK: Daily data since 2001 from the National grid, available at 
http://www.nationalgrid.com/uk/Electricity/Data/;  Ireland: Daily data since 2002 from 
Eirgrid, available at http://www.eirgrid.com; Denmark: Daily data since 2000 from 
Energinet, available at http://www.energinet.dk; Finland: Daily data since 2004 from Fingrid, 
Chapter 5: Options Pricing 
 97 
 
I exclude Malta, Cyprus and the Baltic States from the analysis, because the former 
are not integrated into Europe’s electricity grid and no daily electricity consumption 
data for the latter is available.  In terms of annual electricity production, the 20 
countries included account for 99% of total production in the EU-25.70   
The EU produces nearly all of the electricity it consumes, with net 
imports/exports accounting for less than 0.1 percent overall consumption.  I therefore 
exclude imports/exports in my calculations and set consumption equal to production.   
In order to accommodate the variation in type and provenance of the data I 
will carry out the analyses separately for each group f countries for which the 
available data is of the same type (e.g. daily vs. monthly) and covers the same time 
period.  The six groups are listed in Table 5.1.  Figures 5.1a-f show the available pre-
2006 electricity consumption data by group.  All countries have daily data for the 
years 2006 and 2007.   
For precipitation, I use the European Climate Assesment and Dataset.71  This 
dataset contains daily data for 1,048 monitoring stations located in 42 countries.  The 
length of the series varies from a few years to >150 years, with most series spanning 
                                                                                                                                  
available at http://www.fingrid.fi; Sweden: Daily data since 2000 from Svenska Kraftnät, 
available at http://www.svk.se/web/Page.aspx?id=5794.    
70 In 2007, Romania and Bulgaria joined the Union to make it the EU-27.  However, because 
they were not part of the market during the first two years, and their registries were not ready 
until the end of 2007, they can be excluded from Phase I.   
71 Klein Tank et al. (2007): “Daily Dataset of 20th-Century Surface Air Temperature and 
Precipitation Series for the European Climate Assessm nt”, available at eca.knmi.nl, last 
accessed in September 2008.   
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several decades.  To model the stochastic process underlying precipitation, I use data 
covering the years 1976-2005.   
The conversion of precipitation into hydroelectric power is location-specific.  
For example, rainfall in the Netherlands or in Denmark is largely irrelevant for power 
generation because these countries have very little installed hydroelectric generation 
capacity, whereas hydro generation constitutes a large share of total power production 
in Alpine and Scandinavian countries.  I average station entries by country,72 and then 
create a weighted European average using installed hydroelectric capacity in 2006 as 
weights.73  Installed hydro generation is given in the last column of Table 5.1.   
Weighted precipitation in millimeters (mm) is shown in Figure 5.2 for a 
subset of the sample period.  Whereas it is difficult to visually discern a pattern in the 
raw data (Fig. 5.2a), using moving 7-day-average (Fig. 5.2b) reveals a clear 
seasonality.   
 
                                                
72 For low-lying countries such as Belgium and Luxembourg, I simply take an average of all 
monitoring stations.  However, since hydro generation in the Alps and in Scandinavia is 
highly location-specific, I take an average of the subset of monitoring stations that are located 
in or near mountains.  A full list of the selected stations is available from the author upon 
request.   
73 This data comes from UCTE (www.ucte.org) for continental Europe; from Nordpool 
(www.nordel.org) for Scandinavia; from the Austrian Energy Agency 
(www.energyagency.at/enercee/) for the Baltic States; from Harrison (2005) for the UK; and 
from the Electricity Supply Board (ESB, available at 
http://www.esb.ie/main/about_esb/power_stations_intro.jsp) for Ireland; all accessed in 
September 2008.   
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5.4.b.) Parameter estimation for electricity consumption and precipitation 
I estimate the parameters xxxxx D,,,, 210 ωβββ  and ][ ixσ  with a model that 
features an autoregressive error to account for mean-r version and multiplicative 
heteroskedasticity to allow the variance to differ ac oss months:  










































Note that the index x now covers six different electricity consumption series, 
plus the (weighted) precipitation series, all of which are estimated separately by 
maximum likelihood.   
The parameters xx 10 ,ββ  and 
xD  are the same as in (5.14) and are estimated 
directly.  The transformation of the sine wave plus the phase angle into a sine and 
cosine wave is based on a Fourier transform and serve  to linearize the equation.  The 
parameters x2β  and 


















;   hcccx ,...,,, 621=  
The t-statistics and confidence intervals have to be calculated using the delta 
method.   
                                                
74 See, for example, Beckwith et al. (1995), p. 131.   
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I estimate the daily variance ][2 ixσ  from the autocorrelation parameters 
xφ
and the variance of the white noise ][2 ixξ .
75  For a stationary AR(1) process, the 
variance is given as  
















The mean-reversion parameters xa  measure the speed at which a shock to tx  
is felt at later times.  From (5.16), the expectation of future electricity consumption or 
























This makes it clear that the term )( staxe −−  is equivalent to the impulse-response 
function of the AR(1) process defined by76   
 stst −= φχ ),(  
                                                
75 Because I cannot estimate an AR(1) parameter with data that only contains entries for 
every 3rd Wednesday per month, I use the 2006-7 data to estimate this parameter for Series 1-
3.  Likewise, the estimate of the variance is sensitive to the frequency of measurement 
(Hayashi and Yoshida, 2005) and generally improves with greater frequency.  I therefore also 
use the 2006-7 data to estimate the variance and the correlation coefficients (see below).  
Note that for all other parameters, I use pre-2006 data only.  Note that the daily variance and 
mean reversion parameter for Series 4-6 are not significantly different between pre- and post-
2006 data.   
76 See Hamilton (1994) p. 53-54.   
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which measures the impact of an exogenous shock occurring in period s on the 
variable in period t.  Equating the two and solving yields  
(5.25) )ln( xxa φ−=  
All parameter estimates are given in Table 5.2.   
I compute the correlation coefficients among the different series klρ  
)...,,,,( 11 hcclk =  by using the data from 2006-2007, for which all series have daily 
entries.77  The results in Table 5.3 show that electricity consumption across the six 
different regions is highly correlated, but that precipitation weighted by available 
hydroelectric power and electricity consumption is not.  Because the correlation 
coefficient between precipitation and all six electricity consumption series is zero, I 
will set jhcCovhcCov ttst
j
ts ∀== 0],[],[ .   
I derived the expressions for the variance and covariance in (5.16), (5.19) and 
(5.21) for total electricity consumption.  Due to the six different data groups the parts 
                                                
77 Hayashi and Yoshida (2005) developed an unbiased etimator to compute the correlation 
coefficient between time series of different measuring intervals, but that estimator is not 
bounded by unity in magnitude, relying on truncation instead.  Also, this would only address 
the problem of differing frequencies within the same time period, but not that of different 
time periods.   
Using the much higher-frequency data for 2006-2007 is equivalent to assuming that the 
covariance between electricity consumption in the six different regions and EU-wide 
weighted precipitation is the same before and after January 1, 2006.  For the two groups for 
which ample data is available (groups 4-6), this assumption appears to hold.  Note that the 
market participants very likely have much better information about these covariances than 
what would be gleaned based on a few monthly data points from pre-2006 data available to 
the researcher.   
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involving electricity consumption that are based on overall consumption have to be 
adjusted to  








tsts cEcE  





































































































5.4.c.) Evaluation of the options pricing formula 
With these parameter estimates, I can now proceed to valuating the options 
pricing formula.  Because emissions were below the total cap at the end of the 
market, as well as for each year individually, I will disregard the second line of 
equation (5.6).  I use first- and second-phase over-the-counter (OTC) allowance 
prices from Point Carbon.   
The mean and standard deviation of future emissions are a function of free 
parameters and estimates of the mean, variance and covariance of the processes for 
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electricity consumption and precipitation.  Substituting (5.11) and (5.12) into (5.6) 
and simplifying gives  
(5.26)      
































































where At  and Bt  are known functions of the parameters of the diffus on processes 
for electricity consumption and precipitation.   
To account for the price crash after the first round of emissions verifications, I 
add dummy variable to allow for the updating of firms’ expectation about emissions 
from other sectors (and emissions of other firms in the power & heat sector for that 
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where 1−Φ  refers to the c.d.f of the standard normal distribu ion and EVtD  is a 
dummy that takes on the value of zero before the first round of emissions 
verifications, and of one thereafter.  Given the price crash in April 2006, EVS  has to 
be positive, implying that firms updated their expectation of the total number of 
remaining available permits upwards.  I use an annul interest rate of 10% for the 
calculation of the discounted penalty.78   
Total emissions from other sectors or emissions during 2005 are contained in 
VSTKK +−≡ 0 , where V  stands for any time-invariant parameter that shift the 
amount of permits available to the power & heat sector for the years 2006-2007.  
Note that K  has to be negative, since 0S  is the total cap and the number of permits 
available to power generators (net of the correction associated with minimum 
generation TK ) has to be positive.   
Estimates for the free parameters K , γ  and EVS  can be computed by taking 
averages of tY  for the period before and after the allowance price crash.  Note that the 
parameters are not individually identified, such that one of them has to be held fixed 
in order to calculate the others.   For example, when olding EVS  fixed, K̂  and γ̂  are 
defined as  
                                                
78 Use of 0% and 20% did not alter the results significantly.  





































where )(| ⋅tY  refers to the conditional sample average.  Results for fixed values of 
EVS  are shown in the left panel of Table 5.4.  The shaded areas are the parameter 
combinations that make economic sense.  The emission intensity γ  has to be 
somewhere between 600 and 900 tCO2/GWh,79 which is the case for 
MTSMT EV 150100 << , and for MTKMT 770,1660,2 −<<− .  Both ranges are 
plausible: The range for EVS implies that firms expected 2005 emissions to exceed th  
annual cap by 6-56 MT, but instead they turned out t  be 94 MT below.80  The range 
for K  means that of the about 4,200 MT of permits issued for the years 2006 and 
2007, between 42-63 % were used to cover emissions of power generators.81  The 
goodness of fit (defined by the model sum of squares divided by total sum of squares) 
is 0.81, much larger than the corresponding values for the model presented in Chapter 
3 (see Tables 3.1-2).   
                                                
79 The average emissions intensity of the marginal generators in the EU will not exceed that 
of a coal-fired power plant, which emits about 920 tCO2/GWh.  The emission intensity of 
Combined Cycle Gas Turbines (CCGTs) is about half of this, but coal is at the margin for the 
majority of the load in the EU.   
80 The first round of emissions verifications found emissions to be 94 MT below the total 
2005 allocation.   
81 Note that the sector defined as “Power & Heat” accounts for about 70% of total emissions, 
but this includes production of heat as well as industrial process combustion, not just 
electricity producers.  
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Figure 5.3 shows the predicted price series, along with the actual allowance 
price and the forward price for second-phase allowances.  The estimated series 
follows the data quite well until the April 2006 price crash, after which it falls below 
the actual price, before crossing it and finishing the period slightly too high.  
Importantly, the prediction shows the post-crash stabilization followed by a gradual 
decline to zero observed in the real price series, which has puzzled market observers.  
This is the result of the probability of a binding cap slowly approaching zero, as time 
progresses and actual emissions are observed.   
A striking difference between prediction and actual price is the volatility.  The 
allowance price series appears to fluctuate much more than the prediction, which of 
course could be due to shocks in unobserved variables that drive emissions that end 
up in the model residual.  However, there is an alternative explanation:  If power 
generators had a better idea about the variance of future demand than the researcher 
(because they have access to better data, especially for the area which they have 
exclusively serviced for decades before market liberalization), then I would have 
overestimated the standard deviation of future generation denominated by Bt  in 
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(5.27).  A too large standard deviation would attenuate demand shocks, leading to a 
prediction that is too smooth and too inert to electricity demand shocks.   
To evaluate this possibility, I test the results for their sensitivity to tB .  I 
divide tB  by 10  and 10, corresponding to a factor of 10 resp. 100 by which my 
estimate for the variance exceeds the estimate used by the market participants.82  The 
predictions are shown in Figure 5.4.  It is clear that the results are greatly influenced 
by the uncertainty embedded in future emissions.  Whereas the larger correction 
appears to overshoot and lead to excessive price volatility, the more modest 
correction by one order of magnitude fits the data much better, with a goodness of fit 
of 0.92.  The corresponding estimates for K , γ  and EVS  are shown in the right panel 
of Table 5.4.  Again, for sensible emission intensitie  (shaded region), the associated 
values for EVS  and K  are plausible.   
 
5.5  Conclusions 
In this paper I derive an allowance pricing formula based on the assumption 
that firms were not able to engage in significant abatement during the first three years 
of the EU ETS, and therefore had no control over thir emissions.  In this case, the 
value of an allowance can be characterized by an options pricing formula for a cash-
                                                
82 Note that when computing the standard deviation of future consumption using the 2006-7 
data and adding all the series up, I get a result that is about 1.4 times lower than the standard 
deviation calculated using separate series.   
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or-nothing call option.  This formula contains the m an and standard deviation of CO2 
emissions for the remainder of the market.   
I calculate daily emissions based on daily demand for electricity generated by 
conventional thermal combustion.  This is a function of total electricity consumption 
and the availability of non-emitting sources for electricity such as hydro and nuclear.  
I assume that these processes are characterized by iffusions and estimate the 
diffusion parameters using market data.  This allows me to express the allowance 
price as a function of data, estimates for future emissions and three free parameters.   
The parameter estimates are highly significant and make economic sense.  The 
predicted allowance price series fits the actually observed prices quite well, especially 
when adjusting the estimate for future electricity demand volatility downwards, based 
on the hypothesis that power generators had a better idea about it.  Importantly, the 
model is able to explain the price stabilization after the price crash, followed by a 
long and steady decline towards zero, which can be explained by a declining 
probability that the cap was going to be binding.  A model based on abatement 
parameters would only be able to explain such a move ent if the price of 
fundamentals related to abatement also expressed such a steady decline, which was 
not the case (see Chapter 3).   
I conclude that the allowance price during the first phase of the EU ETS was 
to a large extent driven by the penalty for noncompliance and the probability of a 
binding cap, at least for the years 2006 and 2007.  This could be due to the speed of 
market-setup, which did not allow the involved firms to adjust their emissions in 
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time, and/or the realization after the April 2006 price crash that the market was likely 
to be oversupplied with permits and that therefore abatement measures would not be 
profitable.   




Chapter 6:  Conclusions 
 
In my dissertation I examine the relationship betwen first-phase allowances 
in the EU ETS and various price drivers.  In Chapter 3 I start with the most 
commonly cited market fundamentals that are assumed to drive marginal abatement 
costs, but find them to have little explanatory power for the allowance price path, 
despite using the best available data.   I then go on to test the allowance market for 
the presence of a price bubble.  The results are consistent with the presence of a 
bubble (or a series of bubbles), although a conclusive proof of the existence of a 
bubble is impossible on theoretical grounds.   
In my analysis I skip the issue of how the bubble(s), if any, got started, and 
focus exclusively on their presence.  But something must drive the price up initially 
before self-fulfilling expectations can form and take over.  In Chapter 4 I focus on the 
group that profited most from the high allowance price: Power producers, due to free 
allocation and cost pass-through to electricity prices.  Although no reason for price 
inflation in competitive markets, the presence of market power can change this.  The 
problem with this hypothesis is that power producers were net buyers of allowances, 
and existing economic theory predicts that they would decrease, rather than increase, 
the allowance price, provided that they had market power.  I show that when taking 
the interaction between output and permit market into account, this prescription no 
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longer holds true.  Actual allocation amounts and cost pass-through rates in the EU 
ETS indicate that dominant power producers would indeed have found it profitable to 
inflate the allowance price.   
Chapter 5 is to some extent complementary to Chapter 3: If allowance prices 
were not driven by marginal abatement costs, is there an alternative explanation to a 
bubble?  There is some evidence supporting the hypot esis that firms simply did not 
have enough time to adjust their process emissions in time for the first phase.  In this 
case, the allowance price would be driven by the penalty for noncompliance and the 
probability that the overall cap turns out to be binding.  I set up an options pricing 
model that has these characteristics and find that i  fits the data well, better indeed 
than the market model in Chapter 3.  One caveat for the findings of the options 
pricing paper is that they only apply to the years 2006-7.    
 
Taken together, my findings imply the following:  
First, the allowance price during the first phase of the EU ETS was not equal 
to marginal abatement costs.  This could be due to the formation of a price bubble, 
market power in the power sector or firms’ inability to engage in timely and 
significant abatement.  It is quite possible that all three of these reasons were involved 
simultaneously or sequentially: A bubble needs to get started somehow, which would 
reconcile the first two reasons.  Also, the bubbles results are much stronger for the 
period before the crash, whereas the options pricing story may apply to the latter part 
of the market only.  In this case, it would not have been so much inability, but rather 
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unwillingness to abate on the part of power producers, once they were fairly certain 
that the market was going to be long after the price crash.  Thus, my findings are 
consistent with market power starting a bubble, which then sustained itself for a while 
until it was popped by the first round of emissions verifications.  From then on, firms 
were no longer concentrating on abatement but rather on optimizing their allowance 
portfolio, taking the stochastic nature of emission into account.   
Second, regardless of the exact combination of reasons, the fact that first-
phase allowance prices were not equal to marginal ab tement costs means that the 
first phase of the EU ETS failed from the perspectiv  of reaching a given emissions 
goal at least cost.  It is possible that the prime goal of the EU was not the design of an 
efficient policy instrument for 2005-2007, but instead to prepare the EU for the Kyoto 
compliance period of 2008-2012.  But this could argu bly have been achieved at a 
lower cost to consumers and the economy as a whole, c nsidering the large increase 
in output prices without the benefit of an emission reduction.   
Future cap-and-trade markets should be set up such that they avoid the 
problems encountered during the first phase of the EU ETS.  Specifically, regulators 
of future markets should consider auctioning most if not all allowances, which would 
avoid the problem of market manipulation while giving the regulator the opportunity 
to reimburse consumers for higher output prices from carbon cost pass-through.  
Further, more frequent rounds of emissions verificat ons would prick any price 
bubble sooner by breaking the cycle of self-fulfilling expectations and bring the price 
back to its fundamental value.  Lastly, companies should be given sufficient time and 
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regulatory certainty to engage in large-scale abatement decisions.  If the time is too 
short, or the price signal to uncertain, the allowance market may deteriorate into a 
betting game where firms aim to reach compliance exclusively by buying allowances 
on the market, rather than abating emissions.   
Future research is needed in this area.  The second phase of the EU ETS, as 
well as upcoming carbon markets in the eastern USA, Japan, Australia and Canada 
should be examined as to whether the permit price is truly driven by marginal 
abatement costs.  Another promising area of research would be the design of 
sophisticated auctioning schemes that would allow the regulator to gather more 
information about firms’ marginal abatement costs.  This knowledge would aid in 
setting the cap as well as in determining whether te is a discrepancy between 













Table 2.1: Summary results for Phase I of the EU ETS 
  2005 2006 2007 Total Phase I 
     
Price (time average) € 18.40 € 18.05 € 0.72 € 12.39 
Trading volumea 262 Mt 817 Mt 1,364 Mt 2,443 Mt 
Trading valuea € 5.4 billion € 14.6 billion € 28.0 billion € 48.0 billion 
Allocation 2,099 Mt 2,072 Mt 2,079 Mt 6,250 Mt 
Emissions 2,010 Mt 2,031 Mt 2,041 Mt 6,081 Mt 
Surplus (volume) 89 Mt 41 Mt 39 Mt 168 Mt 
Surplus (%) 4.22 % 1.98 % 1.85 % 2.69 % 






Table 3.1: Results from estimating Equation (3.10) 
  Full period Pre-crash Post-crash 
    
D.GasF 26.0812*** 37.5707*** 20.0823*** 
   p <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 
D.Coal -26.1478 333.9588 -22.2437 
   p 0.8549 0.2534 0.7444 
Temp5d W -3.7832 -7.2270 -1.7798 
   p 0.5922 0.6950 0.6378 
Temp5d S 11.2833 65.2161* 13.3100** 
   p 0.3355 0.0606 <0.0001 
D.Res 0.4370 -29.7230 0.2881 
   p 0.9744 0.4210 0.9652 
Crash -4.1946***   
   p <0.0001   
N 609 333 272 
Chi2 2143.59 29.95 54.23 
p <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 
LL -415.91 -244.37 -143.59 
AIC 847.81 502.74 301.17 
BIC 883.11 529.39 326.41 
Goodness of fit# 0.2481 0.0376 0.0105 
*: p<0.1; **: p<0.05; ***:p<0.01; all variables defined in text 






Table 3.2: Results from estimating equation (3.11) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Pre-crash Post-crash Pre-crash Post-crash 
     
D.GasF 53.1555*** 28.7834*** 42.2153*** 32.4172*** 
   p <0.0001 <0.0001 0.0001 <0.0001 
L.D.GasF 30.1149***  20.3575***  
   p <0.0001  0.0100  
L2.D.GasF 9.0277  -10.7088  
   p 0.4483  0.4630  
D.GasS  -17.1810***  -7.4000** 
   p  <0.0001  0.0182 
L.D.Coal 268.0765  93.2723  
   p 0.2671  0.7679  
D20.Coal  -16.3700  4.3739 
   p  0.1694  0.8020 
Temp1M W -0.0008 -0.0010** -0.0007 0.0002 
   p 0.2149 0.0171 0.3869 0.7611 
Temp1M S 0.0074*** -0.0015*** -0.0025* -0.0003 
   p <0.0001 0.0010 0.0696 0.5886 
D5.Res  -18.2342***  2.2228 
   p  <0.0001  0.6021 
D20.Res -0.1130 18.6926*** -0.0460 -2.2647 
   p 0.2287 <0.0001 0.7251 0.6056 
L.D.EUA   0.1724*** 0.4123*** 
   p   0.0085 <0.0001 
L2.D.EUA   -0.0827* -0.1305*** 
   p   0.0756 0.0043 
L3.D.EUA   0.1140*** 0.0973*** 
   p   0.0008 0.0001 
L4.D.EUA   0.1699*** 0.0379** 
   p   <0.0001 0.0358 
L5.D.EUA   -0.0224 0.1149*** 
   p   0.6284 <0.0001 
N 329 272 318 253 
Chi2 152.08 293.00 260.52 188.26 
p <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0002 <0.0003 
AIC 469.88 234.24 439.52 162.35 
BIC 504.04 266.69 492.18 211.82 
Goodness of fit 0.1092 0.0278 0.1325 0.2374 






Table 3.3:  Cointegration test results 
  Full period Pre-crash Post-crash 
    
A(1) -0.09517 -0.49985 0.38262 
   p 0.247 <0.001 0.006 
B1(1) (Gas) -0.00016 0.00146 0.00225 
   p 0.971 0.822 0.868 
B2(1) (Coal) -0.03021 -0.31725 0.10131 
   p 0.764 0.018 0.749 
B3(1) (Reservoirs) 0.00210 -0.03683 0.00839 
   p 0.497 0.005 0.350 
B4(1) (DAX) -0.00002 0.00032 -0.00043 
   p 0.671 0.024 0.107 
_const 0.3711 1.1521 2.3260 
   p 0.589 0.152 0.412 
    
Unit Root test onz t  -0.391 -0.974 -0.543 
Unit Root test on   
( 







Table 3.4:  Results from regime-switching tests 
 Full period pre-crash post-crash 
    
p 0.979 0.984 0.995 
q 0.994 0.931 1.000 
LR statistic 118.320 38.940 60.360 







Table 5.1: Data availability and installed hydroelectric capacity by country 
Country per Start of data seriesa Hydro capacity 
data series Type Year Sourceb in 2006 (MW) 
Series 1     
   Austria 3rd Wed. 1994 UCTE 11,811 
   Belgium 3rd Wed. 1994 UCTE 1,411 
   France 3rd Wed. 1994 UCTE 25,457 
   Greece 3rd Wed. 1994 UCTE 3,133 
   Italy 3rd Wed. 1994 UCTE 21,070 
   Luxembourg 3rd Wed. 1994 UCTE 1,128 
   Netherlands 3rd Wed. 1994 UCTE 37 
   Portugal 3rd Wed. 1994 UCTE 4,948 
   Spain 3rd Wed. 1994 UCTE 20,714 
Series 2     
   Germany 3rd Wed. 1996 UCTE 9,100 
Series 3     
   Czech Republic 3rd Wed. 1999 UCTE 2,175 
   Hungary 3rd Wed. 1999 UCTE 46 
   Poland 3rd Wed. 1999 UCTE 2,324 
   Slovak Republic 3rd Wed. 1999 UCTE 2,429 
   Slovenia 3rd Wed. 1999 UCTE 873 
Series 4     
   UK daily 2002 Country TSO 4,256 
   Ireland Daily 2002 Country TSO 512 
Series 5     
   Sweden daily 2001 Country TSO 16,180 
   Denmark daily 2000 Country TSO 10 
Series 6     
   Finland daily 2004 Country TSO 3,044 
a:  All countries have daily data starting in 2006 
b:  UCTE:  Union for the Coordination of transmission of electricity;  





Table 5.2: Parameter estimates for diffusion processes 
  c1 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 h 
        
N 168 144 108 1,460 2,190 730 10,950 
Const. 1486.06 1248.56 654.25 763.47 569.68 207.54 23.45 
   z 22.73 36.44 17.47 16.92 25.12 1.95 44.10 
Trend 86.98 5.33 4.84 9.06 -2.07 1.20 -0.01 
   z 32.44 3.92 3.42 5.57 -2.44 0.33 -0.28 
Mo n/a n/a n/a -20.84 -3.51 0.66 n/a 
   z n/a n/a n/a -22.31 -5.98 1.60 n/a 
Fr n/a n/a n/a -20.31 -13.98 1.01 n/a 
   z n/a n/a n/a -20.31 -22.31 2.31 n/a 
Sa -416.47 -207.72 -72.13 -128.22 -67.15 -15.71 n/a 
   z 32.44 3.92 3.42 -101.66 -97.18 -28.56 n/a 
Su -750.21 -328.49 -128.43 -157.64 -72.43 -21.45 n/a 
   z -13.80 -26.70 -12.23 -133.32 -103.87 -43.08 n/a 
XNY n/a n/a n/a -86.72 -37.25 -11.54 n/a 
   z n/a n/a n/a -20.08 -12.89 -4.85 n/a 
β2
x  (sine) 375.85 145.36 116.96 134.10 104.99 36.98 3.00 
   z 18.99 25.19 32.22 35.09 41.12 10.91 7.06 
ω x  (phase) 1.33 1.39 1.41 1.23 1.34 1.35 -0.40 
   z 42.06 49.94 46.71 38.54 47.09 14.26 -2.96 
         
AR(1)* 0.58 0.39 0.59 0.84 0.86 0.91 0.52 
   z 18.95 11.32 21.52 95.98 87.02 74.92 103.92 
a* 0.54 0.94 0.53 0.18 0.15 0.09 0.65 
   z 10.24 10.68 11.38 17.15 13.20 6.94 68.02 
        
σ[i] *       
Jan 499.71 133.17 88.72 65.21 46.42 23.69 17.21 
Feb 316.67 94.92 53.10 45.35 42.27 23.84 16.15 
Mar 366.30 119.39 64.96 67.47 41.32 21.19 19.15 
Apr 453.41 142.96 79.08 79.32 51.52 31.36 14.49 
May 400.48 135.97 55.56 92.75 48.67 33.66 16.28 
Jun 387.02 132.80 59.94 45.64 46.51 34.84 16.54 
Jul 427.82 116.79 55.50 20.17 30.71 12.12 18.07 
Aug 305.51 97.78 50.71 69.65 12.10 7.77 20.91 
Sep 389.43 122.02 61.45 23.50 18.56 7.65 20.21 
Oct 387.15 120.30 64.95 31.66 27.65 11.17 22.63 
Nov 432.38 108.56 73.35 39.00 35.50 19.57 21.50 
Dec 414.69 163.85 85.40 96.82 55.91 42.84 17.68 






Table 5.3: Correlation coefficientsa among different series 
  c1 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 h 
c1 1.000       
c2 0.8814* 1.000      
c3 0.9016* 0.8730* 1.000     
c4 0.4554* 0.2976* 0.4927* 1.000    
c5 0.5170* 0.3897* 0.6032* 0.9231* 1.000   
c6 0.4588* 0.3672* 0.5573* 0.8496* 0.9418* 1.000  
h -0.067 0.014 -0.036 -0.038 -0.033 -0.020 1.000 
*p<0.05; all coefficients based on 2006-7 data    
 
a: The correlation coefficient between series x t
i  and x t
j  and the corresponding p-value 
are computed as 
        ˆ ρ =
(x t
i − x i )(x t
j − x j )
t=1
T i , j
∑
(x t
i − x i )2
t=1
T i, j




  ;     p = 2* ttail T i, j − 2, ˆ ρ T i, j − 2 / 1− ˆ ρ2( ) 





Table 5.4: Parameter estimates from options pricing formula 
Original Model using Bt      Model using Bt / 10   
           
1λ  -2,967,479   1λ  -2,955,860  
2λ  -3,134,951   2λ  -2,991,328  
Good. of fit:a 0.8055   Good. of fit:a 0.9232  
        
EVS (MT) K̂  (MT) γ̂   EVS (MT) K̂  (MT) γ̂  
10 -177 60  10 -833 282 
20 -354 119  20 -1,667 564 
30 -532 179  30 -2,500 846 
40 -709 239  40 -3,334 1,128 
50 -886 299  50 -4,167 1,410 
60 -1,063 358  60 -5,000 1,692 
70 -1,240 418  70 -5,834 1,974 
80 -1,418 478  80 -6,667 2,256 
90 -1,595 537  90 -7,500 2,537 
100 -1,772 597  100 -8,334 2,819 
110 -1,949 657  110 -9,167 3,101 
120 -2,126 717  120 -10,001 3,383 
130 -2,304 776  130 -10,834 3,665 
140 -2,481 836  140 -11,667 3,947 
150 -2,658 896  150 -12,501 4,229 
160 -2,835 955  160 -13,334 4,511 
170 -3,012 1,015  170 -14,168 4,793 
180 -3,189 1,075  180 -15,001 5,075 
190 -3,367 1,135  190 -15,834 5,357 
200 -3,544 1,194  200 -16,668 5,639 
Shaded areas: Economically plausible parameter ranges for γ  




























Figure 2.1: Allowance allocation and emissions by EU member 
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Figure 5.3: EUA price, prediction and forward price for Phase II 
 
 










Appendix A: Proof of Equation (3.8) 
Derivation of Equation (3.8) 
 
 
I start by restating equation (3.7):   




























][*][][ βσσ  
If allowance and fuel prices have the Markov property such that ttt PPE ρ=+ ][ 1  where 
tP  represents any price, r+= 1ρ  the discount factor and r the interest rate, at k=T-1 
it must be that  
(A1) ( ) ( )][111 TTTTTTT EhFFd Ψ−Ψ+−+= −−− ρρσσ  
where β)( bgNh +≡ .  Now I move one period back to k=T-2:  
( ) ( )][][)( 1121121221 TTTTTTTTTTtTT EEhFFFFd Ψ−Ψ+Ψ−Ψ+−+−++=+ −−−−−−−−− ρρσρρσσ
 
Substituting (A1) for σT  and rearranging yields 




















−−−−−−−− ρρρσρρρσσσ  
As before, I substitute (A1) for Tσ  and simplify:  

















Now I further substitute (A2) for 1)1( −+ Tσρ  to get  
(A3)  ( ) ( )][)()1( 2323232322 −−−−−−− Ψ−Ψ+−+++=++ TTTTTTT EhFFd ρσρρρσρρ  
The next step would be to move to period k=T-4 and successively substituting (A1), 
(A2) and (A3).  However, the general solution is app rent:  













− ∑∑ ρσρσ  






t ρρσ **1 .  Dividing (A4) 
by the summation term on the LHS yields the result:  



































Appendix B: Proof of Lemma 1 and Eq. (4.9) 
Proof of Lemma 1 
 







































































































To analyze the effect of the dominant firm’s output on output price p and 















































































































































Because P’<0 and ei=xi for i=(2,…,N), it follows immediately from (B1) that 
the numerator is positive.  As for the denominator, the fist term is negative from (B2).  
In order to show that (B4) is negative I have to shw that the term in the brackets is 
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qq CCC  


























Noting the symmetry between i/j and j/i multiplications and dropping the first 























qq CCCCCC  
Squaring both sides of the numerator in (B7) yields  




























qq CCCCCCCCCCCCCC >>++  
where the second inequality comes from the fact that 
 ( ) ( )22 jqeiqejeejqqieeiqqiqeieeiqq CCCCCCiCCC >⇒∀>  
Subtracting the RHS of the first inequality completes he proof:  




























Now I derive the sign of the other three expressions in Lemma 1 by solving 













































































































































Proof of equation (4.9) 
 






























































Multiplying both sides by the two denominators (again reversing the 


































Appendix C: Derivation of variance and covariance of future emissions 
 
Result 1:  Variance of future CO2 emissions 
 















2 ],[2][][  



























( )( )[ ]
( )( )[ ]
{ }{ }[ ]
( )( )[ ] ( )( )[ ]











































































Result 2:  Generalization of the variance for different volatilities  
 







x ,)]([][ 2)(2 == ∫ −− στ  
Suppose that at time s, we’re in month 5 and want to calculate the variance of 
consumption/precipitation in month 8. Using the notati n defined in the text that 
{ }itittit == )(:min)]([min , we have that ]9[]8[]7[]6[ minminminmin ttttts <<<<< .  I 




















































Next, I split the exponents such that they match wit  the new upper limits of 


























































Because the volatilities are constant within each integral, each of them can be 
easily solved:  
( ) ( )






















































Multiplying out and some rearranging gives 
           










































which can be generalized to  


























xx σσσσ  
 
Result 3:  Covariance of x on two different days  
 





























































Multiplying out gives 


























































The second term is the expectation of the product of tw  stochastic processes 
occurring during non-overlapping time periods.  Because a Wiener process is iid, this 
term drops out.  Using the fact that dtdW =2)(  establishes the result:  
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